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Reconceptualizing the
Whistleblower's Dilemma
Miriam H. Baer*
Since its inception in August 2011, the SEC's whistleblowing program
has received over 18,000 tips and has distributed over thirty awards. The
Commission's Enforcement Division has lauded the program, emphasizing
its recoveries (over $500 million in the aggregate) as well as its generous
bounties (over $100 million total). Nevertheless, an agency focused on
deterrence must pay attention to the volume of credible reports it receives
from insiders, particularly because deterrence has been shown to rest so
strongly on the putative wrongdoer's perceived probability of detection.
From that perspective, the program's success is more ambiguous: twentysix covered actions (some involving more than one whistleblower) derived
from afield of more than 18,000 tips.
This Article advances an explanation for the program's modest "hit
rate," which is whistleblowing's effect on the probability of criminal
sanction. If employees who possess the most concrete information of
wrongdoing are also those most exposed to criminal prosecution,
whistleblowing morphs into self-incrimination. This is so because the
whistleblower who voluntarily discloses her participationstrips herself of
her most effective legal protection, the government's difficulty in
establishingher guilty state of mind.
To demonstrate this dynamic, the Article introduces two types of
employees: Complicits (those who have violated the law) and Innocents
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(those with no legal exposure whatsoever). Whereas Complicits possess
more valuable information, they are less incentivized to seek a financial
bounty. The Article then identifies the legal, psychological and
organizationalfactors most likely to inflate the number of Complicits
within the firm, thereby depressing the pool of potential whistleblowers.
The Article then considers the various strategies policymakers might
employ to either dampen or undo this effect.
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INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in 2011, the Securities and Exchange
Commission's whistleblowing program has awarded whistleblowers
over 100 million dollars.' While protecting its whistleblowers'
anonymity, the Commission and its top officials have enthusiastically
praised the various insiders who have come forward, awarding them as
much as thirty million dollars in one case and referring to the program
overall as a "game changer" that has had a "transformative effect." 2
Nevertheless, the actual number of awards the SEC has issued pales in
comparison to the number of tips it has received. 3 Over the program's
first five years of existence, over 18,000 reports have been filed with
the SEC's whistleblowing office. During the same time-period, the SEC
has distributed thirty-four awards relating to twenty-six SEC
enforcement actions.4 Even taking into account additional awards
since announced or in the pipeline, the SEC's whistleblowing "hit
rate" - that is, the percentage of tips that result in a financial recovery
warranting a whistleblower reward - registers just below 0.2%.
The program, which was intended to leverage current and former
employees' knowledge of wrongdoing, has received nothing but
uniform support from SEC officials,5 notwithstanding its flaws. The
1

See

2016

SEC

ANNUAL

REPORT

TO

CONGRESS

ON

THE

DODD-FRANK

WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/files/owb-annual-report2016.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT]. Congress enacted Dodd-Frank in
2010. The SEC created the Office of the Whistleblower in February 2011 and initiated
training sessions for its enforcement personnel in May 2011. Its final whistleblowing
rules (Section 21F or 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F) became effective on August 12, 2011, at
which time its website became effective. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EVALUATION OF THE SEC's WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1, 12

(2013) (describing program's early period). The Office of the Whistleblower treats the
effective date of the whistleblowing rules as the commencement of the program. See
id. at 29 (observing program, "has been only been in place since August 12, 2011").
2 See SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1, 10 (setting forth top ten
whistleblowing awards); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Pays More
than $3 Million to Whistleblower (July 17, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2015-150.html [hereinafter SEC Pays].
3 See SEC Pays, supra note 2. Congress enacted Dodd-Frank in 2010. The SEC
set up its first hotline for whistleblowers in May 2011 and published its final
Whistleblowing Rules in August 2011.
4 "Since the beginning of the whistleblower program, the Commission has issued
awards to 34 individuals in connection with 26 covered actions, as well as in
connection with several related actions." SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at
17. The 2016 Report counts all awards through September 30, 2016, which is the
conclusion of the fiscal year. Id. at 1 n.1.
5 As Christina Parajon Skinner notes, public officials have voiced far more
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statute authorizing the program, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, could be clearer. 6 Some observers
worry the program short-circuits the internal compliance function
within corporations, while also granting the SEC too much discretion
to decide how to handle tips and complaints.7 A thicket of
implementation rules restrict the number and type of individuals who
can seek bounties, leaving some groups partially8 or completely
ineligible to participate. 9 Finally, the very ease of filing a tip generates
some number of frivolous complaints by disgruntled employees. 10 All
enthusiasm for the program than private companies. See Christina Parajon Skinner,
Whistleblowers and Financial Innovation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 861, 865 (2016) (observing

that private sector has been "more reserved" than public officials in favor of SEC
program) [hereinafter Whistleblowers].
6 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). For cases interpreting the term "whistleblower,"
compare Berman v. Neo@Olgilvy, LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming the
SEC's view that "whistleblower" includes individuals who report securities violations
internally), with Asadi v. GE Energy, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding that
Congress unambiguously limited the designation to those who report wrongdoing
directly to the Commission). For recent commentary, see generally Andrew Walker,
Note, Why Shouldn't We Protect Internal Whistleblowers? ExploringJustificationsfor the
Asadi Decision, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1761 (2015).
7 Notably, the would-be whistleblower lacks the power to file a qui tam lawsuit
on the public's behalf. See, e.g., Julie Rose O'Sullivan, "Private Justice" and FCPA
Enforcement: Should the SEC Whistleblower Program Include a Qui Tam Provision?, 53
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 69 (2016); see also Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the
Bounties?: The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 78 [hereinafter Mutiny by the Bounties?]
(arguing that Dodd-Frank's "biggest failure" is that it "does not create true qui tam
structures").
8 Compliance personnel can submit "original information" if 120 days have
elapsed since an internal report, or if a "reasonable basis" exists for believing
disclosure is necessary to prevent a "substantial injury" on investors. 17 C.F.R. §
240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii), (v) (2016). The SEC's whistleblowing rules exclude attorney
disclosures based on privileged information, see id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i), (ii) (2016),
although exceptions here also exist. See Kathleen Clark & Nancy J. Moore, Financial
Rewards for Whistleblowing Lawyers, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1697, 1745 (2015) (parsing SEC's
whistleblowing rules with regard to attorneys); Jennifer M. Pacella, Advocate or
Adversary? When Attorneys Act as Whistleblowers, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027, 1032
(2015) (arguing that SEC's whistleblowing rules potentially conflict with attorney's
professional responsibility and duty of confidentiality to client).
9 Jennifer M. Pacella, Bounties for Bad Behavior: Rewarding Culpable
Whistleblowers Under the Dodd-FrankAct and Internal Revenue Code, 17 U. PA. J. Bus.
L. 345, 356 (2015) [hereinafter Bountiesfor Bad Behavior].
10 See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screening Value
of Qui Tam, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1175 (2014) (theorizing that whistleblowing
program's ease of entry can swamp agency with low value information, thereby
undermining enforcement); see also O'Sullivan, supra note 7, at 69 (warning of current
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of these concerns have been duly cited and discussed, often amidst the
background assumption that regulators and legislators can solve them
with just a few tweaks here and there."
This Article introduces a more profound problem: When a
whistleblower comes forward with credible and specific information,
she exposes her company, her colleagues, and herself to government
enforcement activity, up to and including criminal sanctions. Even if
her tip fails to produce a single indictment, it has the capacity to
generate an intrusive and stressful government investigation, not to
mention a serious civil enforcement action.1 2 The ensuing inquiry may
extend far beyond the reach of the whistleblower's original complaint,
attracting the attention of prosecutors, state attorney generals, and
regulatory agencies. Whistleblowing therefore poses profound risks to
any employee who has violated any law that carries with it serious
penalties. Moreover, whistleblowing's cost rises precipitously for
crimes whose successful prosecution depends on the government's
ability to prove the defendant's requisite mens rea or "state of mind."
For this variety of tipster, whistleblowing is not simply a morally
ambiguous act of snitching; instead, it is tantamount to selfincrimination.
To date, scholars have paid relatively little attention to this dilemma
and its overall effect on whistleblowing's effectiveness as a deterrent.
Instead, the whistleblowing literature has hewed closely to doctrinal
and institutional design questions, asking whether the program should
more closely follow the qui tam framework erected by the False
Claims Act (FCA).1 3 The few scholars to raise the thorny issue of
program's tendency towards "cost-free tipping").
11 Much of this discussion was written prior to the 2016 election of President
Donald Trump. Given the whistleblowing program's general support (albeit with
caveats), this Article presumes the program's continued existence.
12 "A lengthy investigation is likely to change the target's life irrevocably, even if
there is no indictment; an indictment almost certainly will change the target's life,
even if there is no conviction." John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The
Proper Scope of the Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & POLY 423, 425-26
(1997).
13 A qui tam lawsuit is a cause of action filed by an individual on the public's
behalf. It enables private individuals to seek civil recoveries for harms perpetrated on
the public. The False Claims Act, which punishes persons and organizations that
attempt to defraud the United States, is often heralded for its employment of the qui
tam device. See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement's Pathways:
Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 CoLuM. L. REv. 1913 (2014) thereinafter Private
Enforcement's Pathways] (analyzing several decades' worth of qui tam lawsuits). For
Freeman Engstrom's comparison of whistleblowing regimes, see David Freeman
Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory Context and the
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"whistleblower complicity" have conceptualized it primarily as a
question of eligibility, inquiring whether an individual should profit
from his wrongdoing.14 That question, however, is not this Article's
subject; rather, it is whether the prospect and salience of criminal
liability shuts off the very flow of information bounty programs are
assumed to promote. The concern, the Article argues, is not eligibility
so much as it is viability.
An extensive literature has long explored the social, psychological
and economic harms visited upon whistleblowers. 15 These are the
damages observers cite most when exploring the traditional "dilemma"
endured by putative whistleblowers. 16 This Article reconceptualizes that
dilemma. For complicit employees, the sticking point is neither the size
nor certainty of a monetary bounty, much less the ability to take control
of matters by filing a civil lawsuit. Rather, it is the knowledge that
disclosure significantly increases the risk of criminal punishment. This
is a problem of unique importance for bounty programs crafted in the
United States, whose federal criminal statutes blur much of the
distinction between incipient frauds and completed ones.
Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 605, 605-06 (2014) (arguing
that nature of harm and determinacy of underlying legal mandate help "structure the
choice" between pure bounty regimes and qui tam provisions).
14 See O'Sullivan, supra note 7, at 77 (describing the ways in which the "SEC
wrestled with the question whether those complicit in the reported securities
violations [should] benefit from their wrongdoing"). Jennifer Pacella has provided the
most in depth treatment of the eligibility question as it relates to wrongdoers,
comparing the SEC's bar on recovery with the IRS' program, which excludes payments
only to those convicts who "instigated or planned" the illegal conduct. See Pacella,
Bounties for Bad Behavior, supra note 9, at 349-50, 376-77 (registering preference for
SEC's approach). Robert Howse and Ronald Daniels have also addressed
"whistleblowing complicity," albeit more abstractly. See Robert Howse & Ronald J.
Daniels, Rewarding Whistleblowers: The Costs and Benefits of an Incentive Based
Compliance Strategy, in CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA 525, 538-39 (Ronald
J. Daniels & Randall Morck eds., 1995) (arguing against a "hard-and-fast rule
preventing an individual who is implicated in wrongdoing from recovering a
whistleblower reward").
15 See, e.g., Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to Encourage
Corporate Whistleblowing, 2006 BYU L. REv. 1107, 1144 [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley's
Structural Model].
16 The Senate Committee Report supporting the creation of the SEC's bounty
program describes the standard dilemma as the employee's "difficult choice between
telling the truth and the risk of committing 'career suicide."' See S. REP. No. 111-176,
at 111 (2010), https://www.congress.gov/111/crpt/srptl76/CRPT-111srptl76.pdf; see
also Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on CorporateFraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213,
2240, 2245 (2010) (identifying negative consequences to whistleblowers, including
"retaliation from fellow workers and friends, personal attacks on one's character
during the course of a protracted dispute, and the need to change one's career").
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Some readers may challenge the Article's premise, given the
prosecutions in the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis. 17 Government

prosecutors have repeatedly reminded the public how difficult it is to
prosecute individuals for frauds and similarly deceptive acts when
evidence is lacking.' 8 If white-collar prosecutions are so "rare," 19 why
should fear of criminal prosecution play such an important role in the
average employee's decision to blow the whistle?
A closer examination of white-collar criminal law resolves this
tension. It is indeed difficult to prosecute individuals for behavior that
either originates in or resembles legitimate business activity. 20 The

reason for this difficulty, however, is that prosecutors often lack proof
of an individual's state of mind. 2 ' Whistleblowing partially alleviates
this problem, particularly when it reveals the content of a private
conversation or provides a recitation of elaborate efforts to conceal
data. Such evidence enables jurors to infer that offenders knew what
they were doing, and that their behavior was not merely risky, but in
22
fact deceptive and wrongful.

&

17 For a pointed critique of the government's failure to pursue criminal prosecutions in
the wake of the mortgage crisis, see Jed S. Rakoff, The FinancialCrisis: Why Have No HighLevel Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REv. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions. On the
relative scarcity of corporate prosecutions in general, see BRANDON GARRETT, Too BIG TO
JAIL: How PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 82-84 (2014) (pointing out
relative paucity of prosecutions of corporate executives in conjunction with their
companies' settlements with the Department of Justice).
Is "[I~n some instances, it is simply not possible to establish knowledge of a
particular scheme on the part of a high-ranking executive who is far removed from a
firm's day-to-day operations." Att'y Gen. Eric Holder, Remarks on Financial Fraud
Prosecutions at NYU School of Law (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opal
speech/attorney-general-holder-remarks-financial-fraud-prosecutions-nyu-school-law.
19 Daniel Richman, Federal White Collar Sentencing: A Work in Progress, 76 LAw
CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 63 (2013) (arguing that the political economy of federal
prosecutions renders white collar prosecutions "pretty rare").
20 "When the corporate actor engages in crime, she does so in a social setting in
which she is embedded in activities that society has chosen, at the basic level of
capitalist economic structures, to treat as not only legitimate but desirable." Samuel
W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE LJ. 823, 877 (2014)
[hereinafter White Collar Offender].
21 Although the Dodd-Frank program permits the whistleblower to file a
complaint anonymously through her lawyer, the SEC's regulations prohibit the
payment of any bounty until it has learned the whistleblower's identity. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.21F-7(b)(1)-(3) (2016).
22 "To secure a conviction for [foreign bribery cases], prosecutors generally need
to prove some degree of scienter and they need to prove that scienter . . .. The most
difficult element for the government to prove in FCPA cases is corrupt intent."
O'Sullivan, supra note 7, at 82. Professor Buell has written extensively on the
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In the wake of a major corporate scandal, many employees can
plausibly deny complicity in any wrongdoing. The whistleblower who
discloses an illicit scheme and alludes to her own state of mind,
however, takes a terrible risk, particularly if she has joined in that
scheme with knowledge of its underlying wrongfulness. 23 When all
facts are known, the federal laws of fraud, obstruction, and bribery
emerge as extremely powerful tools. Accordingly, for many employees,
"whistleblowing" - now hailed as a lucrative opportunity to secure a
government bounty - is intertwined with a terrible downside, the
disclosure of one's state-of-mind and consequent exposure to criminal
fines and imprisonment.
If employees perceive whistleblowing as a form of selfincrimination, monetary bounties are bound to fall short, as few
individuals will accept a cash bounty in exchange for their increased
exposure to a jail sentence.2 4 At the same time, the unwinding of a
whistleblowing bounty regime - particularly one ushered in with as
much fanfare as the SEC's program - broadcasts its own array of
undesirable messages. Accordingly, the decidedly second-best move
may be to leave the program intact while quietly downplaying its
minimal effect on deterrence. The Article thus serves as a warning for
other regulators: be careful what you wish for.25

importance of mens rea in regard to white-collar crimes such as fraud and bribery. See,
e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 GEO. L.J. 547 (2015); Buell,
White Collar Offender, supra note 20; Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61
DUKE L.J. 511 (2011) [hereinafter Securities Fraud].
23 Although the Supreme Court rejected a private cause of action for aiding and

abetting securities fraud in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1994), the SEC can still pursue civil actions premised on aiding
and abetting, and the Department of Justice and United States Attorney's offices may
seek criminal indictments under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012), which treats principals and
accomplices as equals. Joseph A. Franco, Of Complicity and Compliance: A Rules-Based
Anti-Complicity Strategy Under Federal Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 1, 61 n.250
(2011).
24 Alternatively, regulators may need to inflate bounties to such a point that they
attract false claims. "[Wihen the risk of a false report is sufficiently high ... it is
desirable to provide no whistleblower award." Yehonatan Givati, A Theory of
Whistleblower Rewards, J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 56-57 (2016).
25 See, e.g., David Cooper, Blowing the Whistle on Consumer FinancialAbuse, 163
U. PA. L. REV. 557, 580-98 (2015) (proposing bounty program administered by
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau for "information that protects consumers'
financial welfare"); Karie Davis-Nozemack & Sarah J. Webber, Lost Opportunities: The
Underuse of Tax Whistleblowers, 67 ADMIN. L. REv. 321, 322-23 (2015) (arguing for
revamped IRS bounty program); Skinner, Whistleblowers, supra note 5, at 882-84
(citing efforts to expand whistleblowing programs).
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The remainder of this Article unfolds as follows. Part I briefly
discusses Dodd-Frank's whistleblower program, its reporting
mechanics, and the provisions that have occasioned the strongest calls
for reform. Part II elucidates the whistleblower's self-incrimination
problem by introducing two categories of employees: "Innocents,"
who have witnessed wrongdoing, but are legally innocent of any
violation, and "Complicits," who are technically guilty of at least one
federal crime. Part 11 also identifies the factors that are most likely to
heighten or lessen the number of Complicits within a given firm. Part
III analyzes the various responses a policymaker might adopt to
address the problem. It also considers the applicability of the
Innocent/Complicit framework in other contexts.
1.

A PROMISING BOUNTY PROGRAM

Several scholars have meticulously traced the evolution of the SEC's
whistleblowing bounty program. 26 In the wake of several blockbuster
accounting fraud scandals that boiled over in the 1990's and early
2000's, Congress responded in Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 by enacting a number of provisions that purported to protect
whistleblowing employees from retaliation. 27
Following the financial crisis and mortgage meltdown of 2008,
Congress again revisited the plight of whistleblowers when it enacted
the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. In addition to strengthening outstanding
anti-retaliation provisions, Congress sought an additional tool to draw
forth information from corporate employees, namely a financial
reward. This Part briefly reviews the bounty program's origins,
analyzes the "conveyor belt" that best describes the process through
which a "tip" eventually becomes a "reward" and concludes by
surveying the most notable reform efforts to date.
A.

Origins and Eligibility

Although much of the Dodd-Frank Act emerged in response to the
2008 Financial Crisis, its whistleblowing provisions arose out of the
26 See, e.g., Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties?, supra note 7; Amanda M. Rose, Better
Bounty Hunting: How the SEC's New Whistleblower Program Changes the Securities
Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 1235, 1261-73 (2014) (outlining
program and explaining how it works).
27 See 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2012) (criminalizing retaliation when it is undertaken
with retaliatory intent); id. § 1514A (2012) (creating administrative relief with the
Department of Labor and cause of action for reinstatement and back pay). For
implementing regulations, see 29 C.F.R. § 1980.100 (2016).
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SEC's poor handling of information regarding Bernard Madoffs
billion-dollar Ponzi scheme. 28 Harry Markopolos, an analyst and
would-be hero, attempted on numerous occasions to contact the SEC
and demonstrate the fraudulent nature of Madoff's investment
business. 29 Markopolos' claims fell on deaf ears, however, as the SEC's
agents who interviewed him either discounted or misunderstood his
analysis. 30 As a result, Madoffs scheme continued unabated for years
until he admitted his behavior to his sons, whose attorney promptly
contacted federal prosecutors. 3
Congress responded by including in Dodd-Frank a provision that
required the SEC to pay a bounty of between ten and thirty percent of
any recovery in a "covered" or "related" action exceeding one million
dollars to whistleblowers who provided "original information"
pertaining to violations of securities laws. 32 Combined with other
improvements, the bounty would empower the Commission in
preventing and promptly detecting schemes before they embarrassed
the government and rattled potential investors.
To implement the new program, the SEC created a new Office of the
Whistleblower, which would educate the public and task a group of
SEC agents with reviewing and monitoring tips.33 The Office and its

user-friendly website represented a marked turn from the bounty
28 "[W] e have defined a Ponzi scheme as one 'in which early investors are paid off
with money received from later investors in order to prevent discovery and to
encourage additional and larger investments."' United States v. Simmons, 737 F.3d
319, 326 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Loayza, 107 F.3d 257, 259 n.1 (4th
Cir. 1997)).
29 "[T]he tragedy is that the SEC, on multiple occasions, involving multiple
credible complainants, and spanning sixteen years, had opportunities to investigate
and uncover Madoff's fraud." Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory
Failure and the Business Education of Lawyers, 35 J. CORP. L. 363, 365-67 (2009)
[hereinafter Madoff Scandal]. For a highly nuanced account of the Madoff debacle and
the criticism that followed, see Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal:
Three Narratives in Search of a Story, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 899, 899-914 [hereinafter
SEC and the Madoff Scandal].
30 Rhee, Madoff Scandal, supra note 29, at 366-67 (concluding that the SEC
investigators who read Harry Markopolos' memo "were too ignorant to understand its
import"). Langevoort's more charitable reading is that Markopolos came off
"obnoxious and self-absorbed, deep into his own personal crusade against Bernie
Madoff, which caused [the SEC's investigator] not to pay as much attention to the
underlying argument as she should have." Langevoort, SEC and the Madoff Scandal,
supra note 29, at 909.
31 Amir Efrati et al., Top Broker Accused of $50 Billion Fraud, WALL STREET J. (Dec.
12, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122903010173099377.
32 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2012).
33 Rose, supra note 26, at 1269-71 (describing the Office and its personnel).
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program the SEC had employed for insider trading.34 According to
critics, the precursor program was, among other things, insufficiently
generous, difficult to use, and not well known to the public. 35 DoddFrank's bounty program, in contrast, ushered in an enthusiastic
whistleblowing-friendly era at the SEC, assuring ease of
communication and prompt replies from government investigators. 36
Dodd-Frank also strengthened anti-retaliation protections for
whistleblowers. The anti-retaliation provisions set forth in the
Sarbanes-Oxley

Act

(SOX)3 7

enabled

employees

to

lodge

administrative complaints with the Occupational Health and Safety
Administration (OSHA) and seek back pay and reinstatement. 38 DoddFrank improved upon SOX by permitting covered individuals to file
actions in federal court immediately, 39 where they could receive
double their owed compensation and other costs, 40 all within a much

more generous statute of limitations.41

&

34 The SEC's Office of the Whistleblower website is quite user-friendly; it includes
fairly easy-to-follow instructions and tabs for filing claims, and offers viewers an
explanatory overview of the program. See U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION OFF.
WHISTLEBLOWER, https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
35 For an overview of the reward program's deficiencies, see generally U.S. SEC.
EXCH. COMM'N, OFFICE OF AUDITS, REP. No. 474, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC's BOUNTY
PROGRAMS (2010). Within this report, the Inspector General set forth a series of
suggestions that Congress and the SEC eventually incorporated in the revamped
program. See generally id.
36 See, e.g., Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The SEC as the
Whistleblower's Advocate, Address Before the Corporate Securities Law Institute at
Northwestern University (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chairwhite-remarks-at-garrett-institute.html.
37 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C. titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29).
38 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(A)-(B) (2012). For a summary of SOX's antiretaliation protections and their various drawbacks, see Richard Moberly, SarbanesOxley's Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REv. 1, 5-11 (2012)
[hereinafter Whistleblower Provisions]; Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection:
Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud
Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 92 (2007).
39 For helpful comparisons, see Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 773 F.3d
488, 491 (3d Cir. 2014) (describing differences in procedures and remedies); Ahmad
v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2 F. Supp. 3d 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
40 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(c) (2012); Rose, supra note 26, at 1271-72 (describing
changes in anti-retaliation provisions). In addition, the SEC itself can bring an
enforcement action to punish anti-retaliatory conduct. See SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 2 (describing its "first-of-its kind enforcement action" in September
2016 against a gaming company that fired an employee "because the employee had
reported to senior management and the SEC that the company's financial statements
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Notwithstanding its improvements in anti-retaliation law, DoddFrank's most notable innovation lay in its enactment of a bounty
program. Congress' willingness to pay money for information reflected
its implicit recognition that anti-retaliation law could only go so far;
back pay and the threat of lawsuits could not protect employees from
stigma and discrimination too subtle to prove.42 Financial bounties
would therefore close these gaps.
Congress set up a fund to pay bounties and directed the SEC to
develop an appropriate Office and implementing regulations.4 3 The
SEC subsequently promulgated its whistleblowing rules, which are set
forth at 17 CFR 240.21F ("Section 21F"). Under Dodd Frank and
Section 21F, a whistleblower who voluntarily provides "original
information" to the SEC is eligible for a reward when the information
enables the SEC to recover monetary sanctions in civil and "related"
cases in excess of one million dollars.44 Information "leads to" a
successful enforcement action when it is "specific, credible and
timely" enough to cause the SEC to open a new case, reopen a closed
one, or contributes significantly to an ongoing examination's
success. 45
Dodd-Frank and Section 21F bar several groups from receiving
rewards: those who have a "pre-existing legal or contractual duty" to
report to the Commission; attorneys, unless their disclosure is
permitted by SEC or their applicable state bar; compliance and audit
personnel, unless they first disclose their findings internally and wait

might be distorted").
41 Rose, supra note 26. Dodd-Frank amended SOX while also creating a separate
cause of action for whistleblowers. See Meghan Elizabeth King, Blowing the Whistle on
the Dodd-Frank Amendments: The Case Against the New Amendments to Whistleblower
Protection in Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1457, 1480 (2011)
(discussing interplay).
42 On Sarbanes-Oxley's weaknesses, see Dyck et al., supra note 16, at 2250
(finding that Sarbanes-Oxley's protections "ha[d] not increased employees' incentives
to come forward with cases of fraud"); Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: ReSituating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 983, 1022-23 (2005)
(citing studies indicating whistleblowers are often perceived as "deviants" or
"traitors"); Moberly, Whistleblower Provisions, supra note 38, at 21-38.
43 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F (2016) (whistleblower
rules implemented by SEC to run program).

44 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F (2016).
45 Id. § 240.21F-4(c) (setting forth circumstances

in which SEC deems
information as leading to successful enforcement outcome). Approximately 60% of the
whistleblower awards generated through the end of September 2016 involved tips that
caused the SEC to open an investigation, while 40% involved significant contributions
to ongoing investigations. See SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
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120 days or seek to prevent substantial harm to investors; and those
criminally convicted in connection with the reported conduct. 46

Whistleblowers must provide complete and accurate information to
the SEC and affirm under penalty of perjury that they have done so.47
They may also be required to answer follow up questions and requests
for further information. 48 Although the whistleblowing rules shield the
whistleblower's identity from the public, they do not completely
anonymize her from the government. To assert anonymity at the filing
stage, the whistleblower must act through an attorney; before she
collects any reward, she must reveal her identity to the Commission.49
That the SEC requires the whistleblower to disclose herself prior to
collecting a reward underscores another section of the whistleblower
rules, which warns:
The fact that you may become a whistleblower and assist in
Commission investigations and enforcement actions does not
preclude the Commission from bringing an action against you
based upon your own conduct in connection with violations of
the federal securities laws.5 0
As Professor O'Sullivan succinctly observes, "[wihistleblowing . .
does not confer amnesty."5 1
The Whistleblowing Conveyor Belt: Tips, Referrals, Covered Actions
and Rewards

B.

To understand why the SEC's whistleblowing hit rate is so low, one

52
must learn the SEC's framework for handling and referring tips. The

SEC begins with thousands of tips, refers a far smaller number of those
tips to its enforcement agents for review, tracks those tips and advises
46 17

C.F.R.

§ 240.21F-4(b)(4) (2016)

(treating as "unoriginal" information

protected under the attorney-client privilege or learned through audits or compliance
reviews); id.

§

240.21F-4(b)(4)(v) (setting forth exceptions to the above, including

120 days after compliance personnel have reported information); id. § 240.21F8(c)(3) (excluding from eligibility those convicted of a "criminal violation that is
related to the Commission's action or the related action . . . for which you otherwise
could receive an award").

47

Id. § 240.21F-9(b) (whistleblower must declare under penalty of perjury that

his report is, to the best of his knowledge, "true and correct").
48 Id. § 240.21F-8(b)(1)-(3).
49 Id. § 240.21F-7(b).
50 Id. § 240.21F-15.
51 O'Sullivan, supra note 7, at 78.
52 See Rose, supra note 26, at 1270-71 (describing processing system).
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whistleblowers of any "covered actions" that have emerged from those
investigations, and then issues a preliminary determination and then
final order on any whistleblower's specific claim for relief. Were one to
draw a flowchart depicting the SEC's process, it might look something
like Figure 1:
Figure 1: How a Tip Becomes an Award53
Referrals

S Notice of
Co
tion

Preliminary

Whistleblower

Tips

Award $$

4

Covered Action

Determination/

Whist Clower

Final Order
The number of individuals who have contacted the SEC with
information has increased steadily since the SEC first implemented its
whistleblowing

program

in

August

2011.54

According

to

the

Commission's 2015 and 2016 Annual Reports to Congress on the
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program ("2015 Report" and "2016
Report"), the Commission received nearly 4,000 tips in each of fiscal
years 2015 and 2016.55 From its inception in 2011 through the end of

fiscal year 2016, the program received over 18,000 whistleblower tips. 56
To process the public's complaints, the SEC has developed its Tips,
Complaints and Referrals Intake and Resolution System (TCR). The
TCR System enables whistleblowers to file their complaints online
53 A longer and more visually interesting version of this chart can be found in the
SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
54 This Article treats August 2011, the date the SEC's whistleblower's rules became
effective, as the program's "birth" date.
55 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-

FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 21 (2015), at 21 https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/

reportspubs/annual-reports/owb-annual-report-2015.pdf
[hereinafter SEC 2015
SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 23. The "fiscal years"
referred to in this report run from October 1st of the prior year to September 30th.
Accordingly, Fiscal Year 2015 began on October 1, 2014 and ran through September
ANNUAL REPORT];

30, 2015. U.S. GovT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE FEDERAL
BUDGET PROCESS 55 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05734sp.pdf.
56 SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
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(although they can also fax or mail them in hard copy form) and
serves as the primary medium through which the SEC processes each
claim and keeps in touch with reporting individuals.5 7
Each tip is evaluated by the SEC's Office of Market Intelligence
("OMI"). If the OMI believes it "warrants deeper investigation," OMI
assigns it to Enforcement staff in the regional offices, specialty units or
home office for further investigation and follow-up.5 8 The SEC's Office

of the Whistleblower ("OWB") then tracks each of these referred tips
so that it can notify whistleblowers if their tips have in fact resulted in
an enforcement proceeding or related action whose monetary
sanctions exceed the $1 million threshold. 59 Although neither of the
SEC's Reports to Congress disclose how often the OMI refers a tip for
follow-up, the 2015 Report hints at OMI's relatively low referral rate
when it advises that the OWB "currently is tracking over 700 matters"
relating to a whistleblower tip.60

After the SEC recovers monetary sanctions exceeding the one
million dollar threshold, it posts a "Notice of Covered Action"
("NoCA") on its website.6 1 A tipper believing herself eligible for a
whistleblower award then has ninety days to file her claim. The OWB
considers the whistleblower's claim and prepares a preliminary
recommendation, which is reviewed by the Claims Review Staff, a
small five-member group comprised of "senior officers in
Enforcement, including the Director of Enforcement." 62
Pursuant to criteria set forth in both the statute and the SEC's
Whistleblower Rules, the Claims Review Staff issues its Preliminary
Determination on whether the applicant should receive an award and,
if so, for how much. If the Claims Staff decides in the whistleblower's
57 SEC 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 7 ("Exchange Act Rule 21F-9
provides whistleblowers the option of either submitting their tips directly into the
TCR System ... or by mailing or faxing a hard copy").
58 Id. at 25. In certain instances, the SEC might refer the tip to another agency. Id.
59 Id.
Id. The SEC 2016 Report references 800 open matters. SEC 2016 ANNUAL
supra note 1, at 27. Amanda Rose's earlier assessment of the program cited the
SEC's Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, which was released in January 2013.
See Rose, supra note 26, at 1274. That Report, which sampled claims filed between
April 2011 and September 2012, estimated that the OMI declined further action on
69% of the TCR's received during that time period. See id. Although the OIG has yet to
repeat this sampling exercise, one can assume that the referral rate has fallen since
2012, given the increase in tips.
60

REPORT,

61

SEC 2015

ANNUAL REPORT,

supra note 55, at 6. The OWB also announces the

NoCA posting on Twitter and sends an email to an update list that whistleblowers can
join. Id. at 12.
62

Id. at 13.

2230

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 50:2215

favor, its Preliminary Determination is automatically forwarded to the
Commission for consideration. If none of the Commissioners objects
during a thirty-day review period, the Preliminary Determination
becomes a Final Order and the whistleblower receives her bounty. 63
From the program's inception through the end of fiscal year 2015,
the SEC posted 709 NoCAs to its website. 64 During Fiscal Year 2016,
the OWB posted an additional 178 NoCAs, suggesting the
Commission has successfully accelerated the pace with which it
processes whistleblowing claims.65 Whistleblowers wishing to claim a
reward must base their claim on the NoCAs posted on the SEC's
website. Although the SEC's reports to Congress do not reveal how
many claims the SEC has received over the life of the program 66 the
2015 Report advises that the SEC has issued final or preliminary
decisions addressing "more than 390 award claims since the beginning
of the program." 67 Thus, the SEC has received in excess of 390 claims
from would-be whistleblowers. One can infer that a non-insignificant
portion of these claim requests have been frivolous, primarily for two
reasons. First, very few rewards have been granted. As of the SEC's
2015 Report to Congress, only twenty-two whistleblowers had
received awards; 68 as of its 2016 Report to Congress, that number had
jumped to thirty-four (and, logically, so too had the number of
whistleblowing claims). 69 Second, the 2015 Report references at least
two individuals who have been barred from ever receiving an award
70
due to their filing of repeatedly frivolous claims.
63 Id. If the Claims Staff denies the whistleblower an award, its determination
becomes a Final Order if the whistleblower does not object; otherwise, whistleblowers
can seek reconsideration by submitting a written response. Id.
64 Id. at 12.
65 SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. As the OWB pointedly noted,
the SEC awarded more money during Fiscal Year 2016 than all previous years
combined. Id. at 11 (bragging that "the SEC's whistleblower awards in FY 2016 totaled
more than $57 million - exceeding the amount of all awards made in prior fiscal
years combined").
66 The SEC did receive "more than 120" award claims in fiscal year 2015,
"representing a significant increase" over prior years. SEC 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, Supra
note 55, at 1.
67 Id. at 10.
68 Id. at 10 n.16.
69 SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 (listing solely the number of
whistleblowers receiving awards, but not the total number of claims received seeking
an award).
70 SEC 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 14. One of the claims "failed to
include even a remote factual nexus to the covered actions for which the individual

applied." Id.
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Based on the figures provided by the SEC, the graphic
representation of the flowchart described in Figure 1 might be best
expressed as a funnel, as set forth in Figure 2:
Figure 2: SEC Whistleblowing
September 30, 2016.

Program, August

2011

through

Tips: Over 14,000

Referrals: More than 700 [since inception]

NoCA: 968
Claims Filed: undisclosed
Determination:
over 309
Payment:
34

As Figure 2 demonstrates, the SEC receives a large number of tips
and then winnows that number down substantially through its referral
process. 7 It cuts the field a second time when posts its NoCA and
reviews and decides the merits of a whistleblower claim, all of which
takes some time.72 A few whistleblowers possibly take themselves out
73
of the award pool by failing to file timely whistleblower claims.
Given the presence of whistleblowing attorneys who assist in the

71 As of the publication of the 2015 Report, the SEC "currently" had 700 referred
cases under review. Since some number of referred cases would have already
concluded before the filing of the 2015 Report, one can assume the Office of Market
Intelligence has, over the course of the program, referred more than 700 cases to
enforcement units. Id. at 25.
72 As the 2016 Report points out, the "time between the submission of a
whistleblower tip and when an individual may receive an award payment can be
several years, particularly where the underlying investigation is especially complex,
where there are multiple, competing award claims, or where there are claims for
related actions." SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
73 To calculate this "valuable claims rate," one would have to know the percentage
of whistleblowers who filed claims for tips that were referred to enforcement units and
eventually resulted in the posting of NoCA's.
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drafting of such tips, however, it seems highly unlikely that most
whistleblowers simply "forget" about their tip, regardless of how long
the SEC takes to complete its investigation.74
C.

Notable Reform Efforts

In the lead-up to the SEC whistleblowing program's
implementation, critics were most concerned that it would divert
valuable information from internal corporate compliance departments
and incentivize knowledgeable insiders to delay disclosure until the
information became valuable enough to warrant an award.75 The SEC
addressed these concerns by promulgating a number of provisions that
encourage employees to first seek relief from the firm's internal
compliance department before filing a complaint externally. 76 Through
these provisions, the SEC appears to have resolved the concern that
external bounties might unintentionally compete with internal
compliance efforts.77 According to its most recent Report to Congress,
approximately eighty percent of those who have received
whistleblower awards "raised their concerns internally to their
supervisors or compliance personnel."78
7 According to the 2016 Report, "[a]pproximately half of the award recipients
were represented by counsel when they initially submitted their tips to the agency."
Additional tippers, "subsequently retained counsel during the course of the
investigation or during the whistleblower award application process." SEC 2016
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
7 "Perhaps the most vigorously-debated issue was the effect of the whistleblower
program on internal corporate compliance processes." Robert S. Khuzami, Director,
Enforcement Division, Remarks at SEC Open Meeting-Whistleblower Program, May
25, 2011, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spchO52511rk.htm
(announcing
final rules for SEC Whistleblower Program); see also Kathryn Hastings, Comment,
Keeping Whistleblowers Quiet: Addressing Employer Agreements to Discourage
Whistleblowing, 90 TUL. L. REV. 495, 511 (2015) (cataloging objections); Ted Uliassi,
Comments, Addressing the Unintended Consequences of an Enhanced SEC Whistleblower
Bounty Program, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 351, 363-64 (2011) (raising delayed reporting

issue).
76 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(7) (2016) (relation-back provision);
§ 240.21F-4(c)(3) (treating information as original and successful when it is reported
internally and leads to an internal audit, or company's report to SEC); § 240.21F6(a)(4) (providing for greater reward when whistleblower first seeks out internal
compliance channels); Rose, supra note 26, at 1264-65 (summarizing incentives to
encourage internal reporting).
77 "The evidence to date indicates these regulations should be sufficient to induce
internal reporting." O'Sullivan, supra note 7, at 79; see also Rose, supra note 26, at
1278 (observing that several whistleblowing awards involved instances in which the
whistleblower first reported wrongdoing internally but was ignored).
78 SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
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Although the program elicits praise from politicians and the SEC's
Enforcement Division, it nevertheless has encountered several legal
and practical challenges. For example, federal courts disagree on the
meaning of the term, "whistleblower," which arguably clothes the
program with some undesirable uncertainty. 79 Moreover, several
corporations have employed a variety of contractual agreements that
appear to have the design or effect of discouraging whistleblowing.8 0
The SEC has taken several steps to halt the latter development,
including several enforcement actions filed against offending
companies. 8
Critics also cite the SEC's procedures for rewarding tippers.
Although the agency has gone to great lengths to make its system
user-friendly, those who provide the SEC with information maintain
2
little control over their information once they submit their report.
Individuals are welcome to file a tip pro se, but the private securities
83
plaintiffs bar has increasingly begun to occupy this space. As
Professor Julie O'Sullivan observes, the delay and uncertainty that
arise from the SEC's TCR procedure may unnecessarily repel the
attorney-intermediaries who play an important role in screening tips,

7 Compare Berman v. Neo@Olgilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 146 (2d Cir. 2015)
(defining whistleblower broadly as someone who reports wrongdoing internally or to
the SEC), with Asadi v. G.E. Energy, LLC 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013) (limiting
term to those who report directly to the Commission).
s0 See generally Richard Moberly, Jordan A. Thomas & Jason Zuckerman, De Facto
Gag Clauses: The Legality of Employment Agreements that Undermine Dodd-Frank's
Whistleblower Provisions, 30 ABA J. EMP. L. 87, 98-116 (2014) (analyzing several types
of employment agreements and their potential effects on whistleblowing); Hastings,
supra note 75 (using a case study to explore policy consideration of the whistleblower
program).
81 In 2015, the SEC sanctioned defense contractor Kellogg Brown & Root for
employing such agreements and promised to pursue additional companies for engaging in
similar activity. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, COMPANIES CANNOT STIFLE WHISTLEBLOWERS
IN CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS 2015-54 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/
2015-54.html; see also SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 (describing additional
proceedings against companies for using severance agreements whose terms impeded
whistleblowing).
82 See O'Sullivan, supra note 7, at 74. In addition, the SEC employs no specific
mathematical formula for determining the whistleblower's eventual award. SEC 2016
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 (advising that "[a]ward percentages are based on
the particular facts and circumstances of each case").
83 Not everyone views this as a positive development. See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, First
Comes the Whistleblower, then Comes the Securities Class Action?, WALL STREET J., Nov.
17, 2010 (voicing concerns regarding private bar's involvement in SEC's
whistleblower program).
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preparing complaints, and presenting them in a manner the
Enforcement Division finds most useful.8 4
Finally, at the other end of the spectrum, some have cited the
program's propensity to attract false and frivolous complaints from
disgruntled employees.8 5 The SEC's 2015 report to Congress reflects
this problem when it alludes to two individuals who have filed
hundreds of apparently frivolous claims for relief,86 and the SEC's
2016 report suggests a similar dynamic with regard to an additional
individual whose tips have been so numerous (and presumably
frivolous), that the Commission has decided to exclude it from its
calculation of tips received.8 7 Here again, the qui tam action appears to
be the favored method for screening out noisy and unhelpful tips
while effectively attracting more polished, attorney-constructed
narratives of corporate misconduct.88
II.

How WHISTLEBLOWING BECOMES SELF-INCRIMINATION

Congress created a bounty program to encourage employee reports,
induce more effective corporate self-monitoring, and deter violations
of the securities laws. 89 As it turns out, the bounty program wrought
an additional benefit, which was the improved flow of information
between and among the SEC's enforcement agents.
Law and economics scholars have hypothesized whistleblowing's
deterrent effect from a number of angles. 90 These discussions,
See O'Sullivan, supra note 7, at 104-08.
See Casey & Niblett, supra note 10, at 1198 (theorizing problem of government
receiving too many tips and therefore drowning in information); Rapp, Mutiny by the
Bounties?, supra note 7, at 112 (citing concerns regarding disgruntled or ineffective
employees falsely seeking whistleblower status to protect themselves).
86 See SEC 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 14 (describing two individuals
who collectively have filed hundreds of claims and have been permanently barred
from ever receiving an award).
87 SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 23 n. 51 (explaining that FY 2016
tip number excludes tips by a particular individual who provided an "unusually high
number" of whistleblowing tips). The SEC's decision to exclude a single person's tips,
without specifying what it means by "unusually high number" or any additional basis
for exclusion, is problematic insofar as it arbitrarily excludes some tips, but not
others, from its total.
88 See e.g., Casey & Niblett, supra note 10, at 1203-07 (praising the qui tam
action's "screening benefits").
89 "It is the [Office of the Whistleblower's] mission to administer a vigorous
whistleblower program that will help the Commission identify and halt frauds early and
quickly to minimize investor losses." SEC 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 4.
90 See, e.g., Casey & Niblett, supra note 10 (modeling whistleblowing's "noise"
problem and its effect on deterrence); Givati, supra note 24 (creating formal economic
84

85
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however, tend to underestimate the bounty program's interaction with
criminal law. To fill this gap, this Part introduces two categories of
employee, Innocents and Complicits, and analyzes their distinctly
different incentives in regard to monetary bounties.
A.

The Bounty Program'sAdvantages

Whistleblowing bounties are often hailed for their beneficial effect
on deterrence and corporate enforcement. They deter criminals by
increasing the likelihood that fraudulent schemes will be detected. 91
Increased detection, in turn, comes about for several reasons. First, the
prospect of a bounty improves external enforcement efforts because it
elicits valuable information from insiderS 92 and consumes fewer
resources than the hiring of additional enforcement agents. 93 It also
motivates and improves internal enforcement, since a whistleblower
might embarrass the company's compliance program by taking his
information directly to external authorities and demonstrating
deficiencies in the corporation's compliance apparatus. 94 This one-two
punch produces three benefits: (i) it convinces some would-be
wrongdoers to avoid the proscribed conduct altogether; (ii) it
introduces a costly element of distrust within extant conspiracies,
thereby undermining their effectiveness and longevity; and (iii) it
enables the federal government to punish, incapacitate, and seek
disgorgement from those who remain undeterred. 95
model analyzing optimal reward structure); Howse & Daniels, supra note 14
(providing overview of benefits and drawbacks of bounties).
91 "The [program] will have the laudable effect of deterring securities fraud if it
makes it more likely that fraudsters will be caught." See Rose, supra note 26, at 1275.
92 See O'Sullivan, supra note 7, at 67 (arguing that resource-strapped agencies
such as the SEC require "the help of whistleblowers and the private bar"); see also
Skinner, Whistleblowers, supra note 5, at 890 (praising whistleblowers' "early warning
role" in uncovering wrongdoing).
93 See Givati, supra note 24, at 2 (explaining that whistleblowing rewards
represent "wealth transfers" whereas "police officers and investigators" require
expenditures of resources). Then again, a regulatory agency might use its
whistleblower program to justify the hiring of additional agents to investigate and
prosecute credible whistleblower complaints. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FY 2016
BUDGET REQUEST BY PROGRAM 95 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy2016-budget-request-by-program.pdf (arguing for additional Enforcement Division
resources in light of its whistleblowing program). In any event, whistleblowers may
conserve the agency's resources by collecting and processing the documentary and
digital evidence that supports their claims. See O'Sullivan, supra note 7, at 95-96.
94 See O'Sullivan, supra note 7, at 80.
95 On the difference between deterrence and detection of completed crimes (and
whistleblowing's effect on both), see Giancarlo Spagnolo, Leniency and Whistleblowers, in
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Scholars have long argued that bounties work because they
compensate insider employees for the social, economic and
psychological harms that whistleblowers experience. 96 A toxic mix of
norms and biases induce silence and self-rationalization among
employees, who would rather hope for the best than bring about the
worst by snitching on their friends and supervisors.9 7 Bounty
programs seek to alter this state of affairs by encouraging more
individuals to come forward. Increased reporting, in turn, improves
society's view of whistleblowers and reduces the stigma associated
with whistleblowing. 98 Viewed in their best light, whistleblowing
programs not only alter the individual employee's cost-benefit
analysis, but also change the social meaning of whistleblowing itself.99
To understand whistleblowing's effect on the corporation's internal
compliance function, it is helpful to review the economic theory of
compliance. The rule of corporate criminal liability most favored by
scholars is what some refer to as a modified respondeat superior rule
of liability (sometimes referred to as "composite liability"), which is
thought to produce optimal monitoring and reporting. 100

HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST EcoNoMics 259, 263 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., MIT Press 2008).
96 See, e.g., Dyck et al., supra note 16, at 2251 (arguing, in light of findings, that
"the use of monetary rewards provides positive incentives for whistleblowing").
97 For explanations why managers may be reluctant to recognize or confront
organizational wrongdoing, see James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director:
Countering Corporate Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 441 (2004) (hypothesizing
group dynamics that "bind[s] group members together and blinds them to their
failings and abuses"), and Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral
Theory of Why CorporationsMislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social

&

Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 105-06 (1997) (seminal account applying behavioral
literature to explain incidence of fraud within publicly held companies).
98 Readers should note, however, that a financial reward may crowd out intrinsic
reasons for reporting wrongdoing. On crowding-out effects, see Yuval Feldman
Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities,
Duties, and Protectionsfor Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REv. 1151, 1178-80 (2010)
(reviewing literature).
99 Concededly, a financial reward may render the disclosing employee's act less
morally acceptable to his peers than when driven solely by a sense of legal or moral
obligation. See id. at 1200 (reporting that survey respondents held in higher regard
those peers who reported wrongdoing "without the promise of a reward").
100 Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of CorporateLiability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 694 (1997) (advocating
mitigation for monitoring and disclosure of wrongdoing within corporate firms);
Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994) [hereinafter Potentially Perverse Effects] (demonstrating
ways in which strict vicarious liability regime perversely increases the probability of
punishment for crimes that corporate entities detect but fail to deter).
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The argument for a modified vicarious liability regime proceeds
from the foundational premise that corporate managers who benefit
from their employees' wrongdoing maintain little incentive to
investigate or punish them. 101 Strict vicarious liability confronts this
issue by holding the organization legally responsible for its employees'
misconduct.1 0 2 A liability regime that fails to credit the corporation's
efforts to prevent or police misconduct, however, discourages policing
and disclosure of misconduct. 0 3 At the same time, a regime that
imposes liability solely in regard to the corporation's negligence in
meeting some predefined standard (a so-called "duty based regime") is
prone to error and fails to fully internalize the firm's activity-driven
costs.

04

Accordingly, Arlen and Kraakman promote a composite

liability regime that holds the firm liable for all of its employees'
wrongdoing but reduces the sanction when the firm has monitored
and voluntarily disclosed its employees' bad behavior. 0 5
Arlen and Kraakman's idealized composite regime optimally
incentivizes the firm to monitor and report misconduct. Under these
ideal circumstances, the government presumably has little need for
external whistleblowers; the firm's compliance personnel do most, if
not all, of the important work.1 06
How well does the federal government's current enforcement
approach approximate Arlen and Kraakman's prescription? For many,
the answer is "not very." The Department of Justice offers corporate

&

101 Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through NonProsecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REv. 323, 353 (2017) (conceptualizing "policing agency
benefit personally from either tolerating
costs" that arise when "top managers . .
wrongdoing or from deficient policing" of employees); see also Jennifer H. Arlen
William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and
Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 701-03 (conceptualizing securities fraud as an
agency cost).
102 Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 100, at 690 (identifying strict vicarious liability
as a "benchmark norm in the common law"). For more on the respondeat superior
rule's doctrinal underpinnings, see Miriam H. Baer, Too Vast to Succeed, 114 MICH. L.
REv. 1109, 1124 & nn.71-79 (2016).
103 See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 100, at 706-07 (describing strict liability's
failure to induce optimal policing after wrongs have been committed); Arlen,
PotentiallyPerverse Effects, supra note 100, at 836.
104 See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 100, at 692 (explaining duty-based liability's
failure to achieve optimal activity levels); id. at 711 (identifying duty-based liability's
weaknesses when courts fail to set optimal or clear standards).
105 See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 100, at 726-29 (explaining composite
liability and analyzing its benefits in comparison to other regimes).
106 To put it another way: the more the government finds itself in need of
whistleblowers, the greater evidence its corporate liability regime may be faltering.
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offenders leniency in the form of deferred or non-prosecution
agreements, commonly referred to as DPAs or NPAs. 107 For indicted
firms, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines promote their own
form of sentencing largesse. Despite the government's lip service to
compliance and self-policing, however, most observers - on the left,
as well as the right - complain bitterly that the federal government
enforces corporate crime in an ad hoc and insufficiently transparent
manner.108

In an ideal world, properly motivated firms would promote
employee reporting; employees would report their concerns to
supervisors and internal compliance officers; and compliance
personnel would promptly elevate and disclose violations to regulators
and prosecutors. 09 As a result, the need for a robust whistleblowing
bounty presumably would disappear.1 10
Alas, the perfect world does not exist. Some corporations ignore or
explicitly discourage internal reporting. 1 ' Some prosecutors,
meanwhile, fail to judge compliance efforts with sufficient consistency
or transparency.n 2 Thus, depending on one's point of view, the

&

107 For an overview of DPAs and a thorough assessment and criticism of the
process, see generally GARRETT, supra note 17.
108 See id. at 48 (criticizing ad hoc and inconsistent nature of DPA's); Jennifer
Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 321,
353-54 (2012) (rejecting portions of the Sentencing Guidelines' rubric as it applies to
organizations). Then again, these tools are still evolving: "It's worth noting from the
start that the current approach is very much a work in progress, and that the world of
Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) is
only a few decades old." Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L.
POL'Y REV. 265, 277 (2014).
109 This assumption would not hold if either the corporation's board or its most
responsible executives (CEO, General Counsel) were personally responsible for the
wrongdoing. Regardless of the firm's incentives, these individuals personally would
not benefit from disclosing wrongdoing if they themselves were guilty of the
underlying misconduct.
110 Cf. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 98, at 1193 (finding that financial rewards
were unnecessary to spur reporting when survey respondents found the misconduct
sufficiently "severe"). See generally Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of
Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2075, 2095 (2016) (contending that compliance
programs enable lower-level employees to "safely report" concerns to the appropriate
actors within the firm).
nM See Rachel Louise Ensign, Survey: Companies FindingMore Whistleblower Retaliation,
WALL STREET J. (Mar. 9, 2015, 6:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/
2015/03/09/survey-companies-finding-more-whistleblower-retaliation/; see also ETHICS RES.
CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 13, 34 (2014) http://www.ethics.org/research/eciresearch/nbes/nbes-reports/nbes-2013 (indicating fear and relatively high levels of
retaliation among those who report misconduct through internal channels).
112 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate
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government either credits facile compliance too often, or unfairly
discounts genuine efforts at monitoring and disclosure.11 3 On top of all
that, the government either relies on the wrong factors," 4 or demands
reforms that are only tenuously supportive of self-policing." 5
This breakdown in credibility is, to some degree, inevitable.
Corporations are, by nature, structurally complex and opaque.116
Compliance is difficult to assess, both before and even after the fact," 7
and the source of illegal behavior can be difficult to pinpoint.11 8 The
firm's compliance officers may understand the organization better than
outside authorities, but compliance officers themselves are often kept
in the dark.11 9 Accordingly, regulators and prosecutors experience
greater difficulty distinguishing good programs from bad ones,1 20 and
firms just as surely discount the government's promise that it will look
Governance: An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1

&

(2014) (criticizing "ad hoc" nature of governance reforms sought by prosecutors as
part of their DPA process).
113 Compare GARRETT, supra note 17, at 278-79 (stating that "[plrosecutors do not
seem to have a concrete idea how to measure effective compliance"), and David M.
Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1332-33 (2013) (noting that
compliance programs often "exist only on paper"), with Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the
Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent FCPA Enforcements and Suggested
Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393 (2011) (arguing that corporations that
voluntarily disclose FCPA violations are treated unequally despite implementing
compliance changes), and Larry E. Ribstein, Agents Prosecuting Agents, 7 J.L. ECON.
POL'Y 617 (2011) (suggesting that prosecutors do not have the same monitoring
requirements as the corporate agents they are investigating).
114 See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 101, at 3.
115

See id. at 4.

"Private organizations are relatively opaque, the more so the larger and more
sophisticated they are. . . . Division of labor makes ascription of responsibility for
conduct and results challenging." Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the
Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1625 (2007) [hereinafter Criminal Procedure].
117 Even when fraud has not been detected, "it remains difficult to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the compliance function." Sean J. Griffith, supra note 110, at 2105
(describing difficulties in measuring compliance "efficacy").
118 Buell, Criminal Procedure, supra note 116, at 1625. This is particularly true of
financial and technologically sophisticated firms. See Skinner, Whistleblowers, supra
note 5, at 873-74, 893-94.
119 "[D]epending upon company size, average compliance budgets are in the
millions of dollars for multinational companies and for companies in regulated
industries." Griffith, supra note 117, at 2102-03 (2016).
120 Concededly, the government could hire a neutral third-party to investigate the
"root cause" of the misconduct and enforce compliance standards going forward. See
generally Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 123-31
(2016) (describing "enforcement" and "compliance" oriented monitorships).
116
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these

circumstances, we should not be surprised when voluntary disclosure
wanes and valuable information encounters a corporation-created
bottleneck, effectively preventing employee information from reaching
government investigators.122

Happily, the external whistleblowing program relieves this
bottleneck by establishing a direct line of communication between the
employee and the government. If the employee fears that his
employer's compliance department has buried his claim, he can report
the same information to the SEC with the click of a computer button.
Since the corporation's compliance officer knows this, she is more
inclined to take the employee's claim more seriously and investigate it
promptly. Thus, the bounty program induces a quasi-competition for
information, forcing the corporation's compliance department to
compete with its own employees. 123 As a result, it expands the amount
of information the SEC receives while simultaneously improving the
quality of self-reporting by corporate compliance departments. 124
Even better, whistleblowers serve as an independent check on the
corporation's compliance efforts. If a corporation voluntarily discloses
information to the government and the government is aware of no

&

121 I have analogized this dynamic to George Akerlof's seminal work on "lemons"
markets, whereby the buyer so distrusts the seller's claims that he discounts the
seller's product, thereby driving legitimate sellers out of the market. Miriam H. Baer,
When the Corporation Investigates Itself, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL FRAUD AND
MISDEALING (Arlen ed., forthcoming 2017) (manuscript on file with author) (citing
George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcON. 488 (1970)).
122 See id.; Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model, supra note 15, at 1121-25
(describing "executive blocking and filtering" of internal employee reports);
O'Sullivan, supra note 7, at 86 (noting that companies may try to remedy FCPA
violations without disclosing them to external authorities) (citing Robert W. Tarun
Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposalfor a United States Department of Justice Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 155 (2010) (citing those
"situations . . in which corporations rationally and responsibly choose to remedy
bribery conduct internally and not self-report misconduct")).
123 The program still encourages employees to raise their concerns internally before
seeking out the SEC. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4) (2016). Nevertheless, the
bounty program induces a temporal competition between the compliance officer, who
would rather be the first to report wrongdoing to the SEC, and the employee.
124 Richard Craswell's discussion of "static" and "dynamic" disclosures
within
consumer markets further illuminates this point. According to Craswell, the "static"
disclosure increases the amount of information available to a consumer regarding a set
of products, while the "dynamic" disclosure incentivizes "sellers to improve the
quality of their offerings." Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and
How Not to Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REv. 333, 334 (2013). The same
can be said of whistleblowing, at least in its ideal form.
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credible whistleblowing tip lodged already against that company, it
may find the company's claims of self-policing more credible and as a
result, reward the company with greater leniency.
To be sure, the foregoing presents a decidedly rosy portrayal of
whistleblowing. It downplays drawbacks such as false reports and
noise, and it presumes the government's bounty program will elicit a
sufficient quantum of valuable information. In the following sections,
I investigate more carefully this question.
B.

A New Framework: Innocents and Complicits

The deterrence-based justification for paying whistleblowers
bounties rests upon three basic premises: (i) that valuable information
can be coaxed out of employees through monetary bounties; (ii) that
information extraction enhances both external and internal corporate
enforcement; and (iii) the specter of enhanced enforcement improves
deterrence.
This Article does not take issue with the premise that enhanced
information flow improves enforcement, or with the related premise
that improved enforcement deters wrongdoing. It contends, however,
the extraction of information from
that the first premise knowledgeable insiders - is more complicated than scholars often
acknowledge, in part because the location of information within the
employee workplace is not distributed randomly. To the contrary,
where fraud and bribery are the target violations, the people who
know the most about wrongdoing are likely to be wrongdoers
themselves. As soon as a bounty program becomes public, wrongdoers
will only intensify their efforts to quarantine information among other
wrongdoers. Accordingly, the pool of potential whistleblowers will be
comprised of individuals whose "costs" of coming forward differ in
kind and degree from the costs ordinarily associated with
whistleblowing.
To see how this might affect the SEC's program, consider two
categories of employees. The first, which figures prominently in most
125
popular accounts of whistleblowing, comprises innocent bystanders
("Innocents"). Most Innocents are unaware of their coworkers'
wrongdoing. Some possess partial or hazy knowledge of misconduct;
they know that certain supervisors fail to follow certain internal rules,
that their coworkers conduct business surreptitiously, or behave in a
manner that many of us would dub suspicious or "shady." However
125 See, e.g., ROBERT G. VAUGHN, THE SUCCESSES AND
LAws (2012) (touting whistleblowers' heroic qualities).
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valuable these incomplete notions of wrongdoing may be in the
aggregate, standing on their own, they are by definition insufficient to
trigger or significantly advance a government enforcer's investigation.1 26
The explanation for this dearth of quality information is simple:
rational criminals limit their exposure by limiting the number of
bystanders aware of their scheme. 127 This is true even absent a
whistleblowing regime; the fewer people who witness a violation, the
better. 128
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a few Innocents, despite their
bystander status, possess sufficient knowledge of a given securitiesrelated violation to either trigger or assist substantially in a
government investigation. For the purpose of this discussion, one
might call this "valuable information."129 Some Innocents have
personally observed their bosses bribing foreign officials; been
inadvertently copied on emails describing fraudulent billing or
accounting practices; or are aware of fraudulent practices relating to
their employer's SEC filings.130 These are the vaunted tips the
government highlights, and which trigger successful investigations
and notably large recoveries. They are the kinds of tips that caused
researchers to conclude, in one of the more notable studies published
126 Casey and Niblett label these "weak signals" of misconduct.
Casey & Niblett,
supra note 10, at 1192.
127 Scholars who study and write about cartels are particularly aware of this
phenomenon. "[Clooperating wrongdoers, by acting together, inevitably end up
having - as a by-product - information on each others' misbehavior that could then
in principle be reported to third parties, including law enforcers." Spagnolo, supra
note 95, at 261.
128 One might think of this quarantining of information as a type of "detection
avoidance," whereby wrongdoers respond to the threat of sanctions by engaging in
conduct designed to evade or reduce the risk of detection. See generally Chris William
Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331 (2006). For empirical studies
demonstrating the importance of detection probability in the white-collar context, see,
for example, Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, An Experimental Investigation of
Deterrence: Cheating, Self-Serving Bias, and Impulsivity, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 167, 175-82
(2003) (reporting results of cheating experiment, wherein probability of detection was
one of the most important variables).
129 In Casey and Niblett's model, "strong signals" of misconduct are largely
consistent with this term. Casey & Niblett, supra note 10, at 1192.
130 These are just illustrative examples. Innocents may be more apt to discover
some types of violations over others. For an interesting analysis of how the SEC's
whistleblower program has correlated with the types of enforcement actions the SEC
has brought, see Caroline E. Dayton, Note, An Empirical Analysis of SEC Enforcement
Actions in Light of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 215,
235 (2015) (finding lower average recoveries for whistleblowing-friendly claims,
suggesting that bounty programs enable the SEC to uncover lesser violations).
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within the past decade, that employees were responsible for
uncovering seventeen percent of 216 serious corporate fraud cases,
from 1996 to 2004.131
Unlike Innocents, some employees have knowingly participated,
even minimally, in creating, perpetuating or covering up some type of
misconduct. These employees are "Complicits." A "Complicit" is a
person who would be guilty of violating one or more federal criminal
statutes if all facts were known. 132 For purposes of this model,
Complicits comprise all individuals who have, in some way or
another, engaged in wrongdoing. Thus, the ringleader of a given
scheme is as much a Complicit as the unwilling lackey who
reluctantly, but knowingly, plays a bit part in covering up the scheme.
The definition itself is important because it tracks federal criminal
law's broad definition of complicity, as opposed to popularly held
notions of who may be deemed an accomplice.1 33
At this point, one can advance several uncontroversial propositions.
First, assuming relatively strong norms and enforcement, Innocents
ought to outnumber Complicits. This is particularly the case when the
threat of government enforcement is moderately credible or when
community norms coincide with legally stated obligations. In a world
where most people behave well, Innocents ought to constitute the vast
majority.

131 Dyck et al., supra note 16, at 2213-14 (2010) (widely cited empirical study

demonstrating corporate employees' contribution to fraud detection); see also Robert
M. Bowen, Andrew C. Call & Shiva Rajgopal, Whistle-Blowing: Target Firm
Characteristics and Economic Consequences, 85 AcCT. REv. 1239, 1242 (2010) (tracking
governance benefits of "whistle-blowing," broadly defined). Seventeen percent may
sound impressive, but it translates into a grand total of just thirty-six fraud cases over
an eight-year period. Many of the cases studied by Dyck et al. were purely civil cases,
and disclosed during a time period when the government would have been less likely
to seek criminal sanction for securities violations. On the difference between reporting
civil violations and violations likely to trigger criminal sanction, see discussion infra
notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
132 Although the SEC's whistleblower program awards bounties for information
concerning violations of the securities laws, the employee who reports wrongdoing
bears exposure for any federal crime.
133 This narrower understanding of who an accomplice is explains the academy's
failure to adequately investigate criminal liability's impact on whistleblowing. For
example, Dyck et al. say in passing that some employees "might be accomplices,
enjoying some of the benefits of the fraud, but most are not." Dyck et al., supra note
16, at 2240. True enough, "most" employees may not directly share in the proceeds of
a ringleader's fraud. To be found guilty of wrongdoing, however, these employees
need not benefit at all. I discuss this at greater length in Part II.D, infra.
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Second, Complicits will more frequently possess valuable
information and a greater degree of information than Innocents.1 34
Valuable information does not distribute itself randomly.1 35 Complicits

know a lot more about the firm's wrongdoing because complicity
invites silence among innocent bystanders.1 36 Once a ringleader has
identified the two or three employees in whom she can repose her
trust, she will continue to rely on those employees to carry out and
cover up her bad deeds.137
Another assumption is in order, which is that Innocents and
Complicits possess roughly the same amount of information regarding
the company's internal compliance program, as well as governmentsponsored enforcement initiatives and penalties. That is, Innocents are
no less likely than Complicits to be acutely aware or blissfully
ignorant of government's enforcement apparatus.1 38
A final point: the dividing line between the Innocent and Complicit
is, at least to some degree, a matter of perception. The person who
134 In their discussion of whistleblowing, Dyck et al. praise employees as having
"the best access to information." Dyck et al., supra note 16, at 2240. This is of course
true as compared with journalists, external auditors and government enforcement
agencies, but among employees, access to information is sure to differ, and as I argue
here, complicity itself plays a role in filtering the employees most willing to come
forward.
135 Thus, this model differs from that of Casey and Niblett. Casey & Niblett, supra
note 10, at 1192 (assuming "weak signals are evenly distributed across all firms").
136 The exception to this rule arises when the authorities are already aware of and
investigating wrongdoing. In that case, those guilty of wrongdoing may have
incentives to come forward with information if they believe themselves to be
sufficiently exposed to prosecution and punishment. On the incentives of criminally
prosecuted defendants to cooperate with prosecutors, see generally Miriam Hechler
Baer, Cooperation's Cost, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 903 (2011) (analyzing incentives to
cooperate at all), and Jessica A. Roth, Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful
Convictions, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 737 (2016) (describing incentives to provide false or
inaccurate information).
137 A rational actor will disclose information regarding her wrongdoing to another
individual only insofar as that disclosure's marginal benefit outweighs its marginal
cost. Conspiracies might also, as Neal Katyal points out, compartmentalize
information across certain actors, so that only a few actors are aware of the
conspiracy's scope, which in turn reduces the criminal organization's effectiveness in
achieving its nefarious goals. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J.
1307, 1353-54 (2003). Compartmentalization, it should be noted, is slightly different
from the quarantining of information. The former results in some Complicits knowing
more than others (or no one person knowing everything). The latter effect simply
reduces the number of people with knowledge of the criminal scheme.
138 One can relax this presumption and assume that Innocents and Complicits both
possess sufficient knowledge of the company's internal compliance programs and the
government's securities laws.
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genuinely fears criminal prosecution for participation in an illegal
scheme may behave (at least for the purposes of whistleblowing
theory) like a Complicit, even though she is completely innocent of
any crime. One might call this person a False Complicit. 139 False
Complicits behave like real ones until someone credibly advises them
of their innocence.
By the same token, some individuals are guilty of various crimes but
sincerely believe they have committed no violations of law. These
False Innocents are therefore more inclined to seek a bounty, at least
until someone disabuses them of the notion that they are themselves
innocent of wrongdoing.
It is difficult to know how many False Complicits or False Innocents
populate a given firm. If the misperceptions occur at the same rate,
they cancel each other out. There is reason to suspect, however, that
more Innocents wrongfully assume themselves complicit than the
other way around. As white-collar crime grows more salient and
compliance programs more aggressively communicate the content of
federal criminal law, more employees - particularly, lower- and midlevel ones - will mistakenly conclude that they have done something
wrong. 140 Thus, when a firm aggressively promotes its compliance
efforts, more employees will assume they fall under the Complicit
label, even if they are actually innocent. Indeed, an inflated sense of
what the law prohibits is arguably in the compliance officer's interest
insofar as it effectively reduces risky behavior among corporate
employees. Accordingly, to the extent employees err in perceiving
their criminal exposure, we should expect those mistakes to skew,
more often than not, in the direction of guilt.141
More importantly, the consequences of mistakenly perceiving
oneself a Complicit or Innocent differ quite a bit. If I mistakenly
adjudge myself Complicit, then my likelihood of filing a whistleblower
claim drops to zero. On the other hand, if I mistakenly believe myself
Innocent, I still may decide to forego seeking a whistleblowing bounty
for a host of other reasons. 142 Complicits almost never blow the
whistle, but Innocents only sometimes blow the whistle. Accordingly,
False Complicits depress whistleblowing more than False Innocents
inflate it.

thank Sean Griffith for suggesting this very helpful label.
See discussion infra Section II.E.b.
141 Readers should note that this is not the same thing as one's perception of
detection or apprehension.
142 See discussion infra Section IL.E.a.
139
140
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In the sections that follow, I explain the divergent interests of
Complicits and Innocents, and then identify several dynamics that
increase the number of (real) Complicits within the firm.
C.

The Divergent Desires of Complicits and Innocents

The predominant narrative underlying American whistleblowing
programs is one that idealizes the Innocent. Those who praise or
criticize the SEC's bounty program tend to emphasize the plight of the
Innocent above everyone else. 143 The problem with this assumption is
that it ignores the Complicit's complicated and unique incentive
structure.
The strongest reason for concern is that Complicits, unlike their
Innocent counterparts, are not likely to be moved by a monetary
bounty. If a Complicit is an upstanding citizen with a family and
career, the Complicit's strongest wish will be to limit his or her
exposure to criminal liability. The best way to limit that exposure is by
suppressing a crime's probability of detection and punishment.1 44
With regard to white-collar crimes such as fraud, detection requires
not only the observation of an actus reus (e.g., John entered figures in
several ledgers), but also the requisite demonstration of mens rea
(John knew the figures were materially false).
As Professor Buell has powerfully argued, recognition of wrongdoing
plays a key role in signaling whether behavior is legally blameworthy
(i.e., "willful" or "corrupt") or merely an aggressive or reckless business
practice. 145 Evidence the defendant knew he stood on the wrong side of
143 "[C]orporate whistleblowing is first and foremost a moral enterprise." Matt A.
Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of

Dodd-FrankAct "Bounty Hunting", 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 524-25 (2012) (arguing that
whistleblowing programs should encourage employees to come forward not for
money, but rather, because it is "the right thing to do"); see also VAUGHAN, supra note
125, at 151 (contrasting the corporate whistleblower's "courage and dedication to the
best interests of the companies for which they worked" with "the self-serving, often
criminal conduct of the companies' highest officers").
144 "[Mlost defendants will never regard an outcome of confessing and avoiding
criminal sanctions as being as good as not confessing and avoiding criminal sanctions.
First, confessing may force the confessor to stop engaging in profitable illegal
activities . . . . Second, there is a reputational cost to being a snitch. Third, the
defendant may have some small altruism toward her criminal confederates." Richard
H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners'Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82
S. CAL. L. REv. 209, 221 n.44 (2009) [hereinafter Beyond the Prisoners'Dilemma].
145 See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 200708 (2006) [hereinafter Criminal Fraud] (describing Supreme Court's emphasis on
"prevailing mores" and defendants' knowledge and divergence from those mores in
novel instances of fraud).
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that line is thus an essential component of any criminal case. 146 Without
it, the government is unlikely to succeed at trial.
Were the Complicit's overriding goal to avoid the life-changing
"stick" of a criminal investigation and prosecution, then the optimal
strategy for avoiding that stick would be to keep his mouth firmly
shut. 147 This is not to say there exists no method for inducing the
Complicit's disclosure or cooperation with authorities. To the
contrary, the Complicit might well disclose information if she believes
her disclosures will significantly reduce an almost certain sentence of
imprisonment. But, the government has long had in place the perfect
carrot for inducing this kind of trade, which is criminal cooperation,
the process by which the government awards an individual defendant
with leniency at sentencing when she provides evidence or assistance
in the prosecution of a confederate. 148 Notice, however, that in order
to compel this exchange, the government first needs leverage, which
arises in the form of imminent prosecution. 149 That is, the government
must first obtain evidence of one type (or level) of wrongdoing to
secure the Complicit's admission of another type (or level) of
wrongdoing. 150
146 "It turns out that the most important part of the mechanism by which the concept
of fraud evolves to encompass new commercial behaviors is a startling principle . . that
an actor's belief about the wrongfulness of her own behavior - what courts have called
'consciousness of wrongdoing' - justifies punishment." Id. at 1976.
147 See McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners' Dilemma, supra note 144, at 221 n.44
(identifying silence and freedom from punishment as offender's preferred outcome).
Indeed, one would expect any decent attorney to explore with her putative
whistleblower whether she was involved in the reported misconduct and whether she
has considered the ramifications of coming forward with such information.
148 "In the language of the marketplace, leniency is the price that a prosecutor must
pay to purchase the cooperator's information and services." Michael A. Simons,
Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1, 3
(2003). For insight on criminal cooperation in the federal system, see Baer,
Cooperation's Cost, supra note 136, at 921-24, and Katyal, supra note 137, at 1328-29.
149 Leverage accrues through substantive theories of criminal liability combined
with the credible threat of severe sanctions for violating substantive laws. "[I] f federal
prosecutors had been asked to create the sentencing regime that would place the
maximum permissible pressure on criminal defendants to cooperate with the
government, they could hardly have done better than the Sentencing Commission."
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalizationof Organized Crime: Advantages
of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1119 (1995) (explaining why federal
prosecutors are uniquely situated to combat organized crime).
150 Christopher Leslie demonstrates this with regard to the classic game theory
example, the prisoner's dilemma. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game
Theory, and Cartel Stability, 31 J. CORP. L. 453, 457 (2006) (observing that absence of
provable minor crime decimates prosecutor's leverage and effectively eliminates
prisoner's dilemma when prosecutor confronts two defendants).
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Outside the white-collar context, this quandary is well understood.
Indeed, it is the bread and butter of narcotics trafficking and organized
crime investigations. 151 Compare the white-collar employee with a
drug courier. The courier bears far more risk than his white-collar
counterpart because his crime is more noticeable (i.e., the actus reus,
which figures far more prominently in street crime, is more easily
observed). The drug ring's division of labor purposely leaves couriers
and street-level dealers more vulnerable to criminal prosecution than
the kingpins who sit atop such organizations. Traffic laws and search
and seizure doctrines all but ensure the detection of some percentage
of drug couriers as they traverse airports, buses, and highways.152
Upon detection, the police have a nearly air-tight case against the
courier caught with a particularly large haul of drugs; only the rare
individual will be able to mount a credible claim that she truly had no
idea she was carrying two kilograms of cocaine in her car. 153 Thus, for
a substantial number of drug cases, the government's proof of mens
rea will, as a practical matter, run in tandem with the actus reus. And
despite her relatively minor role in the narcotics scheme, the low-level
courier will face a significant sentence of imprisonment.15 4 Not
151 Federal prosecutors concededly rely on cooperating defendants in complex
white-collar crimes such as fraud and bribery. Nevertheless, in absolute numbers, the
government's use of cooperating defendants in high-level corporate fraud cases pales
in comparison to its use of cooperating defendants in drug trafficking crimes. See
generally Roth, supra note 136, at 748-50 (citing Sentencing Commission statistics
indicating high percentage of criminal cooperators among those prosecuted for
antitrust, bribery and fraud related offenses).
152 See generally David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
544, 558-59 (1997) (arguing that traffic laws provide police "limitless opportunities"
to stop motorists); Sarah A. Seo, The New Public, 125 YALE L.J. 1616 (2016) (charting
growth of criminal enforcement through use of traffic laws and car stops); David A.
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment,
1997 Sup. CT. REV. 271, 298-99 (1997) (observing that the Supreme Court's expansive
search and seizure doctrines relating to automobile searches has focused policing
practices on traffic enforcement).
153 Even when a courier contends she was unaware of the contents of her bag or
car, the government may employ a "willful blindness" theory, which equates actual
knowledge with a defendant's purposeful effort to ignore the obvious. See, e.g., United
States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007) (government not obligated to show
that defendant's blindness was manufactured in order to avoid liability; deliberate
ignorance is sufficient). For an earlier exploration of the doctrine's development in
American courts, see Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a
Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 196-210 (1990).
154 "[The Court's sentence increases the cost of 'business' for drug-smuggling
enterprises by making it more difficult to find drug couriers." United States v. Joseph,
No. 15-CR-362, 2016 WL 3212083, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2016) (discussing a recent
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surprisingly then, she will (often, with the encouragement of her
attorney) decide to trade information in exchange for sentencing
leniency.
In contrast, consider the mid-level Complicit who assists her in
concealing a serious FCPA violation. To cover up the company's bribe
of a foreign official, a supervisor routs illicit payments to an
intermediary who is also a third-party contractor. Assume the
Complicit aids in the scheme by preparing fake invoices that
effectively conceal the purpose of the illegal payments.
There is nothing obviously illegal about working with contractors or
preparing documentation reflecting a company's payments to those
contractors. Accordingly, even if the government eventually becomes
aware of the company's bribe, prosecutors may well lack requisite
evidence of the Complicit's state of mind.1 55 If the Complicit speaks
up, and speaks up truthfully, however, the government learns not only
of the scheme, but also of her knowing participation in that scheme.
In sum, whistleblowing functions as a form of self-incrimination.
Volunteering information increases the probability that external
authorities will learn more about the target wrongdoing, about the
Complicit's role in that wrongdoing, and her specific mental state as
she was engaging in said wrongdoing. Finally, should the
whistleblower's claim lead to a full-blown investigation, it may further
disclose additional instances of wrongdoing in which the Complicit
has participated.
Bounty programs - which deal solely in pecuniary awards and little
else - provide little comfort for the Complicit. However steadfastly
the SEC may conceal the whistleblower's identity from the general
public, this vaunted promise of confidentiality does nothing to assuage
56
the Complicit's fears of exposing himself to government authorities.
As for filing an incomplete complaint or shading it in the
whistleblower's favor, the conduct is not only supremely risky, but
also illegal in its own right.1 57 Thus, the sticking point for Complicits
is not one of certainty or price. Nor is it even eligibility. So far as
Complicits are concerned, the whistleblowing reforms scholars most
commonly propose are orthogonal. Congress can revise its definition
courier's sentencing and the court's reasoning that prison sentences reduce the supply
of willing couriers).
155 See Buell, CriminalFraud, supra note 145, at 1998-2000.
156 The SEC's own whistleblowing rules reserve the right to disclose the
whistleblower's information to the Department of Justice and other law enforcement
agencies. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-7 (2016).
157 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8.
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of "whistleblower" however it pleases and the SEC can streamline its
whistleblowing process to a single computer screen. The undetected
Complicit will remain silent.
D. A Caveat: Criminal Law's Salience
Before considering this model further, an important caveat is in
order. Much of the foregoing discussion assumes a criminal law
backdrop, replete with stories of imprisonment and corresponding
social ostracism and financial ruin. This certainly can become the case
for violations of the foreign bribery, insider trading and securities
fraud statutes.15 8 For each of these offenses, the Department of Justice
has indicated both a willingness and ability to follow through on
threats of criminal prosecution. 159 The credible threat of criminal
sanction, made salient by blockbuster prosecutions and their attendant
publicity, induces employees to view themselves through criminal
law's lens.1 60 As the salience literature establishes, the government
need not criminally prosecute every securities fraud to cause

158 See, e.g., Jay Holtmeier, Cross-Border Corruption Enforcement: A Case for
Measured Coordination Among Multiple Enforcement Authorities, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
493, 520-21 (2015) (observing that DOJ and SEC "routinely exercise" concurrent
jurisdiction over cases involving "virtually identical facts"). Securities fraud cases
trigger civil and criminal proceedings, often at the same time. See United States v.
Gupta, 925 F. Supp. 2d 581, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (pointing out that "cases are legion"
in the Southern District of New York "where parallel civil investigations and criminal
prosecutions . . . target the same wrongdoers" (citation omitted)), affd, 747 F.3d 111
(2d Cir. 2014); see also J. Kelly Strader, (Re) conceptualizing Insider Trading: United
States v. Newman and the Intent to Defraud, 80 BROOK. L. REv. 1419, 1445 (2015)
(citing overlap in insider trading cases).
159 Where evidence is lacking, however, the DOJ can still cede responsibility to
regulatory agencies such as the SEC. Many have noted the porous boundary between
civil and criminal securities cases. See generally Buell, Securities Fraud, supra note 22,
at 566 (criticizing dearth of "conceptual distinctions" between civil and criminal
fraud). For a recitation of the distinctions between civil and criminal cases and
penalties, see Joan MacLeod Heminway, Hell Hath No Fury Like an Investor Scorned:
Retribution, Deterrence, Restoration, and the Criminalization of Securities Fraud Under
Rule 1Ob-5, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 3, 4-5 (2007).
160 Salience is further enhanced by the availability heuristic, which causes
individuals to overstate the likelihood of events they can easily recall due to recent
publicity. "When particular information is available or accessible in memory, it has a
greater influence on judgments and decisions." Jennifer K. Robbenholt & Jean R.
Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1122 n.82 (2013) (citing
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristicfor Judging Frequency and
Probability, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973)).
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employees to sort themselves into Complicits and Innocents; to the
contrary, prosecutors need only pursue some violations.161
Salience manifests itself in two important ways. First, the specter of
criminal liability encourages wrongdoers to behave more carefully
around others, thereby amplifying the differences between Complicits
and Innocents.1 62 Second, as criminal prosecution's plausibility
increases, ex post reporting suffers, even among bit players and lowerlevel employees. Here again, the shift from civil to criminal liability
matters quite a bit. The plaintiff-oriented law firm that files a civil
securities fraud suit focuses primarily on deep pockets; it reaps little
benefit from filing a civil claim against a mid- or lower-level employee.
The prosecutor, by contrast, is more than happy to file a criminal case
against mid- and lower-level employees. Their conviction boosts the
government's statistics and demonstrates the prosecutor's commitment
to vindicating the public interest.1 63 More importantly, once under the
prosecutor's thumb, the lower- or mid-level employee will almost
certainly consider a criminal cooperation agreement that delivers
higher-ranking prey. In sum, whereas civil law firms might steer clear of
mid-level employees, prosecutors will share no such compunctions.1 64
Thus, criminal prosecution poses a far greater threat to the lower-level
employee than even the most aggressive civil litigator.
Salience further explains the distinctions between the SEC's bounty
program and other whistleblowing contexts. For example, many large
or publicly held companies routinely employ internal hotlines to
receive reports of misconduct, which can include anything from petty
theft to serious accounting fraud.1 65 For petty violations unrelated to
161 The "intended effect" I speak of in the text is general deterrence. I assume the
government ordinarily views salience as a positive outcome, since the threat of
criminal liability deters wrongdoing. The problem, however, is that the threat of
criminal liability also depresses whistleblowing.
162 "Detection avoidance" can include anything from deleting documents to
intimidating or killing witnesses (with the latter being an admittedly rare occurrence
in white collar crime cases). "If you commit a crime, you will often escape
punishment if no one testifies against you. So you have an interest in keeping
witnesses from testifying." Brendan O'Flaherty & Rajiv Sethi, Witness Intimidation, 39
J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 399 (2010).
163 On what prosecutors "maximize" generally, see Russell D. Covey, Plea
Bargaining and Price Theory, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 920, 958-60 (2016) (arguing that
prosecutors maximize a number of interests).
164 For trenchant criticism of the federal government's prosecution efforts, see
Todd Haugh, The Most Senior Wall Street Official: Evaluating the State of Financial
Crisis Prosecutions, 9 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 153, 181-87 (2015).
165 See, e.g., Assoc. OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 32 fig.27 (2014) [hereinafter ACFE 2014 Global
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serious fraud or bribery, criminal law poses little problem; the
supervisor is not about to go to jail for misusing the company car
(although she may well lose her job). Offenders are not likely to adopt
drastic measures to hide such behavior, and reporting employees need
not fear anything resembling criminal prosecution.1 66
A similar dynamic further separates civil filings under the False
Claims Act, which permits individuals to file qui tam suits on behalf of
the federal government.167 Whistleblowers have filed thousands of
civil complaints alleging a broad variety of fraud schemes, particularly
in regard to the health care and defense industries. 168 If current and
former employees feel comfortable disclosing wrongdoing in civil
lawsuits, why would they avoid the SEC's whistleblowing platform,
particularly when it promises them anonymity?
At least two distinctions deserve mention. First, although the FCA
includes a criminal component, most FCA cases arise out of privately

&

Fraud Study] (noting that of those surveyed, about 68% of all companies employing
more than 100 employees used internal hotlines); J. Paul McNulty, Jeff Knox
Patricia Harned, What an Effective Corporate Compliance Program Should Look Like, 9
J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 375 (2013) (noting prevalence of "codes and training and
hotlines"). Among larger employers, a number now employ separate hotlines for
particular types of misconduct. See Thomas 0. Gorman, Emerging Trends in FCPA
Enforcement, 37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1193, 1210 (2014) (noting that "nearly all"
companies surveyed employed a hotline for anonymous compliance concerns).
166 Whistleblowing's advocates sometimes blur the distinction between serious
frauds and occupational misconduct. For example, Professor Skinner repeats the claim
that: "in the past four years whistleblowers have uncovered 54.1% of frauds in public
companies, versus the 4.1% detected by the SEC and external auditors." Skinner,
Whistleblowers, supra note 5, at 892. This extremely high number comes from the
Senate's 2010 Report, which is based on Harry Markopolous's testimony; Markopolous
was citing the American Certified Fraud Examiners' 2008 Report on Occupational
Fraud ("ACFE Report"). See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 110-11 (2010),
https://www.congress.gov/1 1 1/crpt/srptl76/CRPT-111 srptl 76.pdf. This figure has not
changed since 2008; roughly half of all discoveries of occupational fraud continue to
arise out of employee tips. See ACFE 2014 Global Fraud Study, supra note 165, at 21.
But that is not the whole story. The ACFE reports define "occupational fraud" in an
extremely broad manner, ranging from an employee's "simple ... pilferage of
company supplies" to sophisticated accounting fraud schemes. ASS'N OF CERTIFIED
FRAUD EXAMINERS, 2008 REPORT TO THE NATION ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD & ABUSE 6
(2008), http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE Website/Content/documents/2008rttn.pdf. Only approximately 25% of the frauds evaluated by the ACFE 2008 Report
involved losses greater than $1,000,000, and a significant portion of the victims were
small businesses. Id. at 9. Thus, the fact that "tips" (the term used by ACFE) play such
a great role in uncovering occupational misconduct is not easily generalizable to a
bounty program targeted at serious securities violations.
167 See authorities cited supra note 13.
168 Engstrom, Private Enforcement's Pathways, supra note 13, at 1944-45 (analyzing
data); O'Sullivan, supra note 7, at 72.
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filed lawsuits and remain civil in nature. 169 Whereas private attorneys
can employ the civil False Claims Act to promote aggressive theories
of fraud, federal prosecutors are less able and less inclined to stretch
the FCA's criminal statute. 170 Thus, the bit player in a False Claims Act
case need not fret that her civil claim will morph into a criminal
investigation and prosecution.
More importantly, the False Claims Act is - to borrow Professors
Casey and Niblett's terminology - "court-centric" whereas the SEC's
whistleblowing program is "agency-centric." 171 The interposition of a
civil procedural mechanism between the FCA relator and the federal
government substantially reduces, if not outright eliminates, the
specter of criminal prosecution. Attorneys and their clients do not
ordinarily associate private lawsuits with federal criminal
prosecutions. If anything, the civil plaintiff harbors the opposite fear
- that the government will simply ignore her claim.
By contrast, the SEC's Enforcement Division has notably aspired to
be seen as the preeminent policeman of corporate misconduct. 172 In
addition, United States Attorneys have promoted their insider trading
and corporate fraud prosecutions with an eye towards assuring the
general public that the DOJ does in fact care about white-collar and
corporate crime. Accordingly, criminal prosecution is salient in the
securities context precisely because the officials running those
agencies desire it that way. Accordingly, the "agency centric"
whistleblowing model must contend with an enhanced fear that the

-

169 "While the DOJ can initiate either criminal or civil actions against fraudsters, in
practice most FCA enforcement efforts are initiated as private lawsuits brought
pursuant to the FCA's qui tam provisions." Engstrom, Private Enforcement's Pathways,
supra note 13, at 1944. The criminal statute can be found at 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2012).
For an argument that Section 287 has been underutilized, see Bradley J. Sauer, Note,
Deterring False Claims in Government Contracting: Making Consistent Use of 18 U.S.C.
§ 287, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 897, 904-08 (2010).
170 For example, the United States Attorney's Manual warns federal prosecutors of
circuit splits regarding requirements such as materiality and willfulness under 18
§ U.S.C. 287. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, CRIMINAL RESOURCE
22
MANUAL 922 (1997), https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-9
elements-18-usc-287. For more on how the DOJ has used the FCA's civil provisions to
enlarge the concept of a false claim, see Joan H. Krause, Truth, Falsity, and Fraud:Off
Label Drug Settlements and the Future of the Civil False Claims Act, 71 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 401, 421 (2016). (describing "implied certification" concept in civil FCA cases,
whereby the submission of a truthful invoice for services performed out of compliance
with the government's program conditions qualifies as a false claim).
171 Casey & Niblett, supra note 10, at 1174.
172 Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 610-11 (2012)
[hereinafter Choosing Punishment].
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whistleblowing will lead not only to an investigation of others but also
to an investigation of the person who comes forward with
information.173
E.

Three Factors that Inflate the Number of Complicits

The preceding sections introduced the reader to two types of
employees, Innocents and Complicits, and explained why
whistleblowing programs are unlikely to elicit information voluntarily
from Complicits, particularly when criminal punishment is salient.
The Innocent/Complicit framework's effect on whistleblowing
depends on two factors: the number of Innocents in relation to
Complicits, and the number of Innocents who possess valuable
information. If a sizable number of Innocents populate the corporate
workplace and possess valuable information, a bounty program may
still be viable insofar as it induces reporting from Innocents.17 4 If, on
the other hand, most of the individuals with valuable information are
also Complicits, the bounty program's effectiveness as a deterrent
quickly recedes.
This Section identifies three factors - federal criminal law,
behavioral psychology, and organizational compliance - that inflate
the number of Complicits compared to Innocents and inadvertently
undermine whistleblowing programs. I discuss each of these in turn.
1.

Law

Federal white-collar crime's breadth is a commonplace and even
somewhat cliched observation."1 A variety of open-textured federal
statutes criminalize behavior within corporate settings. Much of that
173 See, e.g., Daniel Hurson, Ten "Rules" for Becoming a Successful SEC
Whistleblower, MONDAQ (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/
261844/Corporate+Commercial+Law/The+New+Rules+For+Becoming+A+Successful+
SEC+Whistleblower (warning in Rule 8 that individuals who had "any involvement"
in the illegal activity should first consult an experienced securities attorney because
the SEC might otherwise pursue the would be whistleblower or refer the matter to the
DOJ for criminal investigation and prosecution).
174 See generally authorities cited supra note 131.
175 "The proliferation and breadth of penal laws the core of the modern
overcriminalization' phenomenon - suggests that legislatures regularly pass punitive
codes they do not actually wish prosecutors or police to enforce fully." Jason A. Cade,
Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 680 (2015); see also Todd

Haugh, Overcriminalization'sNew Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191, 1197-201
(2015) [hereinafter New Paradigm]. For a refutation of the "federalization" aspect of
the overcriminalization critique, see Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking
Claims of Over-Federalizationof CriminalLaw, 62 EMORY L.J. 1 (2012).
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behavior falls within three broad categories: fraud, bribery and
obstruction of justice. The Dodd-Frank Act protects and pays
whistleblowers who report a "possible violation of the Federal
securities laws" which includes accounting fraud by an issuer, insider
trading and violations of the anti-bribery and record-keeping
provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 176
Criminal fraud differs from civil fraud in that it requires no evidence
of loss or injury. The federal fraud statutes are famously inchoate; they
criminalize the scheme to deprive others of tangible property under
fraudulent or false pretenses, and not the scheme's actual success. 177
The federal code covers far more activity than the crimes that are
most readily perceived as securities violations. Thus, the employee
who reports wrongdoing to the SEC must recognize that a subsequent
investigation could reveal any serious federal crime, such as mail or
wire fraud, 178 a willful violation of regulations promulgated by another
agency (e.g., the FDA or EPA), or the making of false statements in a
federal inquiry or otherwise obstructing justice.1 79 Accordingly, the
putative Innocent who contemplates reporting wrongdoing to the SEC
must keep in mind not only her exposure for the crime she is
reporting, but also for any other crimes in which she may have been
complicit.

176 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (2016).
177 "[We have] described wire fraud as a 'crime of attempting rather than attaining.'
The fraud is therefore complete once a defendant with the requisite intent has used
the wires in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, whether or not the defendant actually
collects any money or property from the victim of the scheme." United States v. Aslan,
644 F.3d 526, 545 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
Indeed, some courts stress that "[t]he wire fraud statute does not require intent to
cause pecuniary loss." United States v. Rodriguez, No. 2:11-0296, 2016 WL 5847008,
at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2016) (noting defendant's intention to eventually pay back
person defrauded does not defeat prosecution for wire or mail fraud). Nor does it
require actual reliance or loss. United States v. Goldberg, 455 F.2d 479, 480-81 (9th
Cir. 1972).
178 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (2012) (wire fraud).
179 See, e.g., id. § 1001 (2012) (false statements); id. § 1503 (2012) (obstruction of
justice). The residual language of the obstruction of justice statute is particularly
broad, as it "applies to all stages of the criminal and civil justice process .... Indeed, it
arguably covers conduct taken in anticipationthat a civil or criminal case might be filed,
such as tax planning, hiding assets or talking to police." United States v. Bonds, 784 F.3d
582, 583 (9th Cir. 2015) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Other statutes,
such as 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (2012), criminalize the destruction of documents in
connection with any "official proceeding," or forbid the destruction or falsification of
any document or "object" in connection with a federal investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1519
(2012).
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For example, an individual who played no role in an initial foreign
bribery scheme, but then willfully destroyed documents or lied to a
federal agent during a subsequent investigation is still guilty of one
more obstruction crimes.18 0 The executive who steered clear of his
supervisor's accounting fraud scheme, only to travel or use a facility in
interstate commerce to negotiate some side payment with a
procurement-officer at a private company is almost certainly guilty of
violating the Travel Act. 181 Finally, the employee who falsified or
transmitted results for her pharmaceutical company's drug trial is also
quite clearly a Complicit, even if she avoided the insider trading
scheme her supervisor carried out in conjunction with the
announcement of those results.182

-

In addition to federal criminal law's substantive breadth, two general
rules of criminal liability - conspiracy and accomplice liability
dramatically increase criminal exposure. The federal criminal
accomplice liability statute treats accomplices and principals as
equivalents for purposes of guilt. 183 Thus, the employee who aids and

abets his supervisor's scheme is as guilty as his supervisor, even if the
supervisor is the ringleader or would have succeeded with or without
the accomplice's help.1 84
180 On willful destruction or alteration of documents, see 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012).
181 See id. § 1952 (2012); Jeffrey Boles, Examining the Lax Treatment of Commercial
Bribery in the United States: A Prescriptionfor Reform, 51 AM. Bus. L.J. 119, 135-42
(2014) (describing emergence of commercial bribery statutes and implications under
federal Travel Act and other statutes).
182 See generally, Vandya Swaminathan & Matthew Avery, FDA Enforcement of
Criminal Liability for Clinical Investigator Fraud, 4 HASTINGS SC. & TECH. L.J. 325
(2012).
183 "Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal." 18
U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012). Section 2's general accomplice liability statute is distinct from
the statute that enables the SEC to pursue civil penalties against "any person that
knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(e) (2012). Notwithstanding this distinction, the Second Circuit has drawn on
criminal law's aiding and abetting doctrine to guide its interpretation of Section
78t(e). See SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204, 211-13 (2d Cir. 2012).
184 See Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1245 (2014) (explaining that
an accomplice "is punishable as a principal" when he commits affirmative act with the
intent of facilitating the crime). "One need not participate in an important aspect of a
crime to be liable as an aider and abett[o]r; participation of relatively slight moment is
sufficient. Even mere words or gestures of encouragement constitute affirmative acts
capable of rendering one liable under this theory." United States v. Rufai, 732 F.3d
1175, 1190 (10th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
The accomplice need not "cause" the crime. His assistance triggers his guilt so long
as he intends his assistance to facilitate the underlying offense. See State ex rel. Martin
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Students of criminal law know quite well the black-letter rule that
an accomplice must purposely "associate himself with the [criminal]
venture" and that he "seek by his action to make it succeed."1 85
However substantial this requirement may sound in theory, it is not
particularly onerous in fact. The accomplice's mens rea may be proven
by circumstantial evidence and her affirmative act need not consist of
anything more than the most modest of assistance. 186 And finally, the
accomplice's motive is ordinarily irrelevant to the finding of her guilt.
care
As Justice Kagan recently explained, "The law does not ...
whether [the accomplice] participates with a happy heart or a sense of
foreboding."1 87

Thus, the employee who knowingly and purposefully assists in her
supervisor's scheme (because, for example, she wishes to keep her
job), is a guilty accomplice, regardless of whether she receives any
tangible benefit, or does so only reluctantly.1 88
The federal conspiracy statute is even less forgiving. If two or more
defendants agree to commit a federal crime and just one defendant
engages in an overt act in furtherance of that crime, all of the
defendants are guilty under Section 371 of the federal code.1 89 If a co-

v. Tally, 15 So. 722, 738 (Ala. 1894) (noting that assistance "need not contribute to
the criminal result"). For criticism of accomplice liability's expansiveness in this
regard, see Joshua Dressier, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice
Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 92 (1985) (querying
why the law "treat[s] all secondary parties alike" regardless of their actual
contribution). For a refutation of Dressler's criticism and a philosophical discussion of
accomplice liability and causation generally, see Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding,
and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 402-07 (2007).
185 Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949) (quotingJudge Hand's
formulation in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)).
186 "After all ... every little bit helps - and a contribution to some part of the
crime aids the whole." Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1246 (citing treatise for the proposition
that the defendant need only do "something" to aid the crime).
187 Id. at 1250.
188 The "reluctant accomplice" problem underscores criminal law's distinction
between motive and intent. "Motive describes the reason a person chooses to commit
a crime. The reason, however, is different than a required mental state such as intent
or malice." People v. Hillhouse, 40 P.3d 754, 777 (2002). "Motive, intent, and plan are
distinct concepts that are often blurred because they all concern the mental aspects of
the crime." United States v. Jenkins, 48 M.J. 594, 598 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1998)
(explaining distinctions).
189 Title 18, United States Code, Section 371 provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to
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conspirator wishes to withdraw from that conspiracy, he either must
explicitly communicate his withdrawal to his co-conspirators or report
the conspiracy to authorities. 190 A conspiracy is thus easy to
commence and difficult to exit.1 9 1 Moreover, it poses particular peril
for any employee who happens to suffer weaknesses in impulse
control.192
Finally, under federal law's controversial Pinkerton doctrine, the
employee who joins a criminal conspiracy is liable for not only the
conspiracy itself, but also for all foreseeable substantive crimes her coconspirators commit in furtherance of the conspiracy.19 3
Taken together, federal criminal law's combination of inchoate and
vicarious liability doctrines expose the ordinary employee to an
alarming degree of criminal liability once she crosses some initial
threshold and once her state of mind is known.194 This exposure, in
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). "[The statute] is broad and reaches conspiracies to commit
any offense specifically prohibited by other federal statutes." William C. Tucker,
Deceitful Tongues: Is Climate Change Denial A Crime?, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 831, 878
(2012) (describing Section 371's breadth).
190 United States v. George, 761 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2014) ("Withdrawal is a
difficult defense, typically requiring evidence that the accused confessed his
involvement in the conspiracy to the government or announced his withdrawal to his
coconspirators."); see also United States v. Randall, 661 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (10th Cir.
2011) (requiring explicit communication with co-conspirators or authorities that
offender will no longer be associated with the conspiracy "in any way").
191 Randall, 661 F.3d at 1294 (observing that "[gletting involved in a
conspiracy . . . is a risky endeavor because of the difficulty of getting out"); see also
United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1989) ("A conspiracy is complete
as soon as some overt act is taken to achieve the objective of the agreement.").
192 By the time an employee "thinks twice" about his decision to join in an illicit
scheme, it may be too late. "Withdrawal after entering into the agreement and the
commission of one or more overt acts pursuant thereto does not prevent a conspiracy
conviction of the withdrawing party." United States v. Brown, No. 97-20591, 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 39116, at *18 (5th Cir. Dec. 28, 1998). "[In order to avoid
complicity in a conspiracy, one must withdraw before any overt act is taken in
furtherance of the agreement." United States v. Cervantes, No. 91-50011, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2503, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 1992).
193 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946). For applications of
Pinkerton in the securities context, see United States v. Blitz, 533 F.2d 1329, 1341 n.40
(2d Cir. 1976), and United States v. Samueli, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1161 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (upholding aiding and abetting charge in securities fraud case and observing
that liability also would have been proper under Pinkerton theory).
194 "[I] t is often difficult for a defendant to understand ... the 'in for a dime, in for
a dollar' theory of conspiracy." United States v. Holcomb, No. 07-11210, 2008 WL
2245365, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 30, 2008) (rejecting defendant's ineffective assistance
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turn, omits any front-end distinction between the weakest and
strongest players in a criminal scheme. Although a defendant might
successfully persuade a sentencing court of her minimal participation,
that possibility - and the hoped for lesser sentence accompanying it
- is cold comfort for the Complicit contemplating the SEC's
whistleblowing program.
2.

Psychology

If white collar criminal law is fairly well-known and understood in
even general terms ("the federal authorities can prosecute me and
throw me in jail if I fill out this form falsely"), then a series of related
questions arise: Why do mid- and lower-level employees join in their
supervisor's schemes? Why do mid- and lower-level employees engage
in misconduct that redounds, primarily if not exclusively, to the
benefit of their employer? Why do otherwise honest employees fail to
report the first whiff of wrongdoing immediately, to either internal or
external enforcers? After all, a user-friendly computer screen and
potentially large bounty now awaits them. And for more highly
educated sought-after employees, why not leave the firm altogether
and find a job elsewhere?
The discipline of behavioral finance has devoted itself to explaining
the biases and heuristics that cause corporate employees to acquiesce
and engage in illicit schemes. 195 I will not attempt to repeat this nowvoluminous scholarship. 196 Two biases in particular, however, bear
exploration as they relate to Complicits and Innocents: fundamental
attribution error and temporal inconsistency.
Fundamental Attribution Error. The fundamental attribution error
posits that individuals understate the situational factors that induce
others to engage in wrongdoing. 197 Thus, supervisors and employees
of counsel claim).
195 For an introduction to behavioral economics and an exploration of the
interaction between bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and what the authors
refer to as "bounded self-interest," see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard
Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1476-79
(1998).
196 For excellent articles applying behavioral finance to corporate compliance, see
Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance
with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 71, 83-91 [hereinafter Monitoring] (introducing
behavioral concepts likely to arise in supervision and monitoring of employees), and
Robert A. Prentice, Beyond Temporal Explanations of Corporate Crime, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L.
397, 409-14 (2013) (describing loss aversion and framing effects).
197 See generally Kim, supra note 42, at 993-97 (describing Milgram's famous
experiment testing obedience to authority figures).
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incorrectly assume wrongdoing can be explained or predicted by
personality or personal characteristics ("John's not the type of guy
who would bribe someone") and then are subsequently surprised
when situational factors prove them wrong. 198 ("I can't believe John
bribed that official. He must have been a bad guy all along!"). "The
implicit assumption here," Donald Langevoort aptly summarizes, "is
that cheaters involuntarily emit behavioral signals indicating a lack of
trustworthiness that can be spotted by savvy observers." 199 This
assumption - that we can sniff out the difference between good and
bad guys - unfortunately is as pervasive as it is wrong. 200
The fundamental attribution error yields a number of implications.
A corporation's top executives might believe, quite genuinely, that
their company can do business in China and India without violating
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act because the corporation hosts an
extensive foreign compliance program and has articulated a strong
policy against hiring employees whose backgrounds would suggest a
reckless personality. The same corporation's board might place
excessive trust in a chief compliance officer who appears
conscientious and reliable. His disposition is that of a competent
straight-shooter. Finally, regional and mid-level managers who
supervise work in these geographic areas become overly confident in
the employees who report directly to them because the managers just
know their hires are the ones talented enough to produce higher-thanaverage revenues and not resort to cheating or shortcuts. Their
dispositions imply nothing, but hard work and adherence to rules.
The dynamic is not limited to decisions to authorize business in
foreign countries. Disposition will cause mid- and lower-level
employees to join organizations with a less than perfect understanding
of the situational factors they are likely to encounter. If, as described
above, individuals consistently use dispositional character traits as
heuristics for predicting illegal conduct, they will unwittingly join
organizations and groups whose rules and structures either encourage
or fail to detect such wrongdoing.201 And so long as their
198 "We generally believe, in other words, that bad results arise from bad people
and we ignore or are oblivious to mitigating situational factors." Eric A. Zacks,
ContractingBlame, 15 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 169, 173 (2012).
199 Langevoort, Monitoring, supra note 196, at 88.
200 "[O]bservers underestimate in others the influence of situational factors, and
overestimate character." Id. at 89.
201 Thus,
as Donald Langevoort argues, internal compliance efforts that
underestimate the effects of "tournament style" promotion practices within corporate
firms may fall short of their goals. "[A]n internal controls system may be deficient if it
does not anticipate the risks generated by these tournament survival traits and the
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determinations of character hold steady, the fundamental attribution
error, combined with other well-known cognitive biases, will cause
these same individuals will deny the presence of wrongdoing until it
has become so pronounced they can no longer ignore it.20 2 At that
point, they will be faced with a highly unpleasant decision: speak up
or reluctantly join in someone else's illicit scheme. For reasons laid
out below, they may well choose the latter.
Temporal Inconsistency. Everyone discounts costs and benefits slated
to occur in the future. "Money today is worth more than money
tomorrow" is more than a maxim; it is a reflection of exponential
discounting. The money I receive today I can deploy immediately or
loan to someone else with interest. The money I believe I will receive
next month is both unavailable for use and unable to earn interest. 203
By the same token, the pain I can put off until tomorrow or the
following day is slighter than the pain I experience today.20 4
Exponential discounting can be modeled fairly easily. The farther
out in time a cost or benefit is slated to occur, the lesser its value. 205
Unfortunately, many of us do not apply a stable discount rate. 206
Instead, we apply an extremely high rate for near-term periods and
then a decreasing rate for later ones. Behavioral economists call this
"hyperbolic" or "quasi-hyperbolic" discounting. 207 Hyperbolic
predictably pernicious way they can occasionally play out in the game of corporate
governance." Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from
the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of
Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 289 (2004).
202 "Once an impression is gained, it is insufficiently revised to reflect new
information. There is a bias to the status quo." Langevoort, Monitoring, supra note
196, at 87-88 (explaining individuals' failure to update favorable first impressions).
203 "[Mloney received today is worth more than the same amount of money
received tomorrow. This truism reflects both the effects of inflation, as well as the fact
that individuals are risk averse and prefer definite cash flows today to possible ones in
the future." Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 40 (2015)
[hereinafter Timing Brady] (citation omitted).
204 Yair Listokin, Crime and (with a Lag) Punishment: The Implications of Discounting
for Equitable Sentencing, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 115, 116 (2007) (explaining how
punishment slated to occur in the future impose less deterrent effect than
punishments slated to occur imminently).
205 Robert J. Rhee, The Application of Finance Theory to Increased Risk Harms in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 111, 130-31 (2004).
206 See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics:
Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1033, 1043
(2012) ("Stable, time-consistent preferences require a constant exponential discount
factor.").
207 See generally Jon Elster, Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought, in CHOICE
OVER TIME 35, 35-53 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992) (discussing "how
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discounting causes an individual to perceive the difference between a
piece of pizza now and a piece of pizza an hour from now differently
from the same pair of events forecasted two months in the future. The
hour long wait feels different if it is slated to begin now than if it is to
occur two months from now. 208

Hyperbolic discounting explains preference
switching in
individuals. 209 We say we want to exercise, avoid sugary foods and
quit unhealthy addictions. But when we confront the choice between
engaging in these behaviors and adhering to our original plan of
"delaying" gratification, we suddenly cave to our desires and "switch"
preferences.210 More importantly, after we engage in such behavior, we
register regret, suggesting that we really would have preferred to stick
to our original plan. Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as a
"willpower" failure. 211 Philosophers conceptualize it as a duel of longterm and short-term selves wherein the long-term self wishes to
behave in a socially desirable way, but the short-term self somehow
gets the upper hand and undermines the long-term self's admirable
goals. 212
If "low willpower" is nothing more than a layperson's term for
hyperbolic discounting, one can see why temporal inconsistency
increases the number of Complicits.

213

An employee might genuinely

issues of myopia, deferred gratification, and self-control have been discussed within
political theory"). For more formal, technical models, see generally David Laibson,
Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997), and R.H. Strotz,
Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. EcoN. STUD. 165
(1956).
208 Some conceptualize the problem as one that relates primarily or exclusively to
costs and benefits slated to occur immediately. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Present
Bias and Criminal Law, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1607 (2011) (analyzing temporal
inconsistency's implications for criminal law).
209 This is particularly the case with procrastination and excessive or premature
consumption. See Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM.
EcoN. REV. 103, 104 (1999) (employing temporal inconsistency theory to explain
procrastination and premature consumption).
210 "Over the long term, you want to lose weight, but in the short term, you
become tempted by a piece of chocolate cake and eat it (and later feel remorse)." Baer,
Timing Brady, supra note 203, at 41. Preference switching is more likely, and more
problematic, when an activity's costs and benefits fall in different time periods.
Intertemporal decisions are ones "in which the timing of costs and benefits are spread
out over time." George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal
Choice, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 181 (1989).
211 See Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEo. L.J. 1371, 1378-79 (2011).
212 See Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, A Dual-Self Model
of Impulse Control,
96 AM. EcoN. REV. 1449, 1449-52 (2006) (explaining "dual self" model).
213 Professor Manuel Utset's seminal work in this area demonstrates the ways in

2017]

Reconceptualizing the Whistleblower's Dilemma

2263

believe that she will "do the right thing" when faced with a difficult
situation sometime in the future. The costs of foregoing a promotion,
exposing a fraud, or refusing to conceal a bribe will all look far less
daunting when perceived as something that might occur in the distant
future. By the same token, the benefits of rising within the company,
attaining greater responsibility, and making more money will also
appear less pressing when forecasted abstractly in future time periods.
Now consider the same cost-benefit analysis for a decision that
arises imminently. A supervisor asks her employee to lie for her and
the employee must decide, in the moment, whether to lie and go along
with the supervisor, confront the supervisor directly, or instead report
the supervisor's behavior to the company's compliance department.
Each decision carries with it a mix of intertemporal costs and benefits.
The decision to confront the supervisor may be particularly painful,
and the benefits of reporting the supervisor will almost certainly take
time to materialize.
Some employees might very well reply, if asked (and if prompted
during a compliance training program) that, despite the upfront cost,
the long term benefits of reporting wrongdoing far outweigh the
momentary discomfort of confronting or "snitching on" a fellow
employee. They may come by this belief quite genuinely, particularly
when viewing costs and benefits in the abstract. 2 14 The delayed
gratification and immediate pain that accompanies most varieties of
confrontation, however, will appear quite different when the choice
becomes an immediate and concrete one as opposed to an abstract
decision to occur in the distant future. Accordingly, some percentage
of employees will choose the "easier" route, which in many cases will
entail the provision of affirmative help (however minor) to certain
colleagues and not mere silence. 215 Within this group, some will
which temporal inconsistency fuels criminal behavior generally and corporate crime
more specifically. See, e.g., Manuel A. Utset, Corporate Actors, Corporate Crimes and
Time-Inconsistent Preferences, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 265, 320-24 (2013) [hereinafter
CorporateActors] (conceptualizing internal control provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and
provisions of Dodd-Frank Act as modifications of temporal inconsistency within
corporations); Manuel A. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals and Repeated Time-Inconsistent
Misconduct, 44 Hous. L. REV. 609, 622-25, 659-60 (2007) (explaining hyperbolic
discounting's effect on incidence of crime and recidivism).
214 "Construal theory" contrasts the individual's perception of abstract and more
concrete costs and benefits. Unsurprisingly, concrete costs and benefits are
experienced more intensely. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment, and
the Psychology of Self-Control, 61 EMORY LJ. 501, 545-52 (2012) (explaining construal
theory and its implications for criminal law).
215 For a discussion of this dynamic and the challenges it presents for corporate
compliance officers, see Miriam H. Baer, Confronting the Two Faces of CorporateFraud,
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employ a combination of rationalizations or motivated reasoning to
ease their conscience. 216 Others will suffer regret and misgivings.
Under the criminal code's definition of conspiracy and accomplice
liability, they will be guilty regardless.
Temporal inconsistency inflates the number of Complicits in two
ways. First, it causes employees to underestimate their own likelihood
of joining in or concealing an illicit scheme. As a result, employees are
more willing to work for firms or divisions whose moral reputation is
at least questionable or whose activities brush up against well-known
legal boundaries.217 Like many humans, employees underestimate the
power of temptation and expose themselves to future misconduct
risk.218 Second, once temptation hits, the costs of speaking up appear
incredibly high and the benefits of "going along" appear comparatively
modest. Accordingly, the employee who confidently believed she
would never commit a crime, even if tempted by her supervisors,
eventually finds herself a Complicit.
3.

Compliance

The final inflationary factor is, quite surprisingly, the company's
internal compliance function. Compliance, quite surprisingly, begets
Complicits.
Over the past two decades, corporate compliance has morphed into
a billion dollar industry, comprising an eclectic mix of experts and
vendors steeped in business ethics and educational tools, high-tech
surveillance, and legal advice. 219 Numerous legal institutions either
66 FLA. L. REV. 87, 108-15 (2014) (hereinafter Confronting the Two Faces] (describing

temporal inconsistency and its effect on corporate compliance).
216 For a discussion on rationalizations, see generally Haugh, supra note 175 at
1213-41. For more on motivated reasoning, see Langevoort, Monitoring, supra note
196 at 87.
217 By contrast, individuals aware of their willpower weaknesses will remove
themselves from temptation or otherwise "precommit" themselves. For more on
precommitment and its utility in reducing wrongdoing throughout the corporate firm,
see Baer, Confronting the Two Faces, supra note 215, at 109-10, and Utset, Corporate
Actors, supra note 213, at 324.
218 For an organizational perspective on "misconduct risk," see Christina Parajon
Skinner, Misconduct Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1562-63 (2016) (defining term).
219 "The accumulation of ... legal and regulatory obligations has been branded as a
new 'era of compliance' for corporations." Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The
Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 AM. Bus. LJ. 203, 204 (2016)
(describing rise to power of the corporate legal and compliance departments); see also
GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAw OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT,
COMPLIANCE 168-69 (2014); Charles D. Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law's

AND
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directly require or strongly encourage the firm to maintain a robust
compliance department, replete with investigators and internal
disciplinary processes. 220 Indeed, the compliance function's entire
raison d'etre is the reduction of wrongdoing within corporate settings.
Until now, observers have spilled significant amounts of ink
analyzing whistleblowing's effect on compliance, debating how well
(or poorly) bounty programs complement internal compliance
programs. 221 No scholars to date have considered the opposite
question, namely the internal compliance function's effect on
whistleblowing. As I explain here, a sincere compliance program can
actually increase the number of Complicits relative to Innocents,
thereby reducing the flow of information inside and outside of the
firm. In other words, the corporate compliance function may
undermine whistleblowing's efficacy, and in turn, further impair
compliance throughout the firm.
Begin with the typical compliance program. Assume it promotes
events and activities typical of well-regarded programs. That is, it
educates its employees regularly on developments in applicable laws,
alerts them of red flags and other signs of wrongdoing. Assume further
that it promptly and effectively investigates internal reports of
misconduct, leading to the firm's discipline and termination not only
of those who violate the law, but also of those who transgress or bend
the company's internal ethics rules. 222 For the sake of brevity, I refer to

this type of program as the credible compliance program or "CCP".
The CCP is well funded, highly regarded within and outside the firm,
and employs and recruits well-credentialed compliance personnel. It
is, in sum, the compliance ideal.
With regard to potential employees, the CCP is, overall, a benefit to
the firm. It attracts some candidates, for example, because they prefer
to work for a firm whose internal norms and systems protect it from
corruption and entity-level prosecutions. Nevertheless, even for this
ARLz. L. REV. 1221, 1263-73 (2011).
220 "IT]he contemporary compliance department is the product of a de facto
government mandate that . .. has become a market wide concern." Griffith, supra note
110, at 2081 (tracking compliance's "maturation into a corporate governance
function"). On the growth of internal corporate compliance and extensive advisory
practices within white-shoe law firms, see Bird & Park, supra note 219, at 213-18;
Weisselberg & Li, supra note 219, at 1237 (tracking the corporate compliance
industry's evolving influence in corporate decision-making).
221 See, e.g., Skinner, Whistleblowers, supra note 5, at 901-02 (describing ways in

which whistleblowing can improve cultural norms within businesses).
222 See Griffith, supra note 110, at 2096 (citing general expectation that compliance
function will "train employees on the organization's policies and procedures").
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population, the CCP poses some drawbacks. Some potential
employees may decline employment either because they fear that an
overly aggressive CCP interferes too often in business decisions or
otherwise stifles creativity. 223

With regard to existing employees, however, the effect is
unambiguous: the CCP reduces the number of Innocents who possess
valuable information. When the firm visibly amplifies its compliance
effort and moves from a non-credible to a credible compliance
program, wrongdoers respond by redoubling their efforts to evade
detection and substitute less detectable crimes for more visible ones. 224

Consistent with these avoidance efforts, Complicits do everything
possible to limit the proliferation of information. They hide
information from Innocents, or otherwise convert Innocents into
Complicits by threatening subordinates or bribing employees in
exchange for their assistance and silence. As a result, following the
corporation's installation of its CCP, two ratios fall. First, the number
of Innocents possessing valuable information, as compared with all
other Innocents, decreases, as Complicits do everything to hide their
information from innocent bystanders. Second, the number of
Innocents relative to Complicits also decreases, as Complicits lure
bystanders (through threats and promises) into their illicit schemes.
The creation of a CCP further eliminates Innocents when it
aggressively disciplines employees for violating the company's internal
ethics code. For example, consider the employee who suspects his
colleague is selling information to a hedge fund (whose traders then
trade on the information), but reports nothing to his superiors or
anyone else at the company. Eventually, the employee observes
irrefutable evidence of his colleague's criminal misconduct. Now,
however, the employee realizes his own failure to speak up earlier may
be called into question by the CCP because the company's code of
conduct required his "prompt and immediate reporting" of suspected
wrongdoing. Fearing termination, the employee elects to actively
conceal his coworker's scheme. The CCP's aggressive reporting
requirement effectively induces the Innocent to become a Complicit.
223 For more on the inverse relationship between creativity and compliance, see
generally Donald Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2840762.
224 On substitution effects in criminal behavior, see Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and
the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1308 & n.46 (2008) (citing
Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2391-402 (1997)).
On detection avoidance, see Sanchirico, supra note 128, at 1337 & n.24 (defining
concept) (citing Arun S. Malik, Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement, 21
RANDJ. ECON. 341 (1990)).
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Finally, through its educative programs, the CCP may cause some
number of employees to inaccurately perceive themselves guilty of a
crime. 225 The CCP harbors little incentive to correct such mistakes if it
intends to demonstrate to the government the "hard line" it is taking
on firm-wide behavior. By its very nature, the CCP is the champion of
risk aversion, advising the company's employees to stay as far away as
they can from the fuzzy line that separates aggressive behavior from
illegal acts of fraud. But risk aversion generates costs: once an
employee believes herself guilty of a serious crime, she becomes a
False Complicit, and False Complicits, like their "real" counterparts,
have no interest in blowing the whistle.
Ill.

A

REGULATOR'S DILEMMA

Part II introduced the reader to two types of employees, Complicits
and Innocents, and argued that Complicits are, as a general rule,
immune to promises of financial rewards.
Readers who generally agree with Part II's argument may
nevertheless resist its application to the SEC's whistleblowing
program. For example, some might assume that securities violations,
as compared with other crimes, take place in the open and are
therefore more easily observed by Innocents. If so, this is quite the
departure from conventional wisdom. Others might reason that a
popular program that induces the occasional high-value tip more than
justifies its existence. 226 This too amounts to a departure from the
consensus on deterrence, which establishes the primacy of probability
of detection over all variables. 227 Particularly if whistleblowing
eventually causes Congress to shortchange either the SEC or FBI on
additional enforcement expenditures, the program's opportunity costs
increase proportionally.
Still others might contend that the program indirectly strengthens
the SEC by improving morale and legitimating the SEC as a protector
of the public. 228 In addition, some might explain the program's low hit
225 See discussion supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (introducing concept
of "False Complicit").
226 See, e.g., Skinner, Whistleblowers, supra note 5, at 891-92 (recounting instance
in which whistleblower improved regulators' understanding of trading crash, five
years after it occurred).
227 See generally Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrencein the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME
& JUST. 199 (2013) (citing studies demonstrating that the probability of detection is
the variable that exerts the strongest effect on deterrence).
228 Similar arguments have been made regarding insider trading. See, e.g., Thomas
W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s, 82 IND.
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rate as a temporary phenomenon, one that is sure to change as the
program gets under way and the SEC grows more adept at processing
tips. 2 29 One hopes this is the case. If it is not, the SEC eventually may
find less support for its not-so-new bounty program. Wrongdoers are
most deterred when they sense a credible increase in the likelihood
they will be identified and caught. 230 If the SEC bounty program
attracts even billions of dollars in recoveries, but fails to deter complex
frauds and foreign bribery schemes, it will have achieved something
quite different from the result Congress sought.
If deterrence remains Congress' core objective, then it may wish to
consider several avenues of reform. This Part sketches three
possibilities: (i) narrowing federal criminal law's scope; (ii) providing
amnesty for securities whistleblowers, or (iii) "doing nothing" and
building a separate enforcement regime.
A.

Narrow Criminal Law

The first option, narrowing federal criminal law's substantive and
complicity statutes, is one that already coincides with extant reform
efforts. Toward the end of 2015, Republicans in Congress introduced a
bill that would have created a default mens rea of knowledge for any
crime whose mental state had not already been defined by "law." 23 1
The proposed bill further provided:
L.J. 575, 578 (2007) (contending that Congress conducted insider trading hearings to
capture the public's support).
229 See O'Sullivan, supra note 6, at 90 (citing authority's claim that "floodgates" are
soon to open).
230 Deterrence approaches that emphasize increases in sanctions fail, in part,
because individuals "discount" the additional disutility of additional years in jail. A
ten-year prison sentence is not perceived as twice as bad as a five-year sentence. See A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment
and Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1999) (demonstrating that when
"disutility [from imprisonment] rises less than in proportion to the sentence, raising
the magnitude of sanctions has a smaller effect than increasing their probability"). For
an interesting application of these theories in a white-collar crime case, see United
States v. Yeaman, 248 F.3d 223, 238 (3d Cir. 2001) ("It is widely recognized that the
duration of incarceration provides little or no general deterrence for white collar
crimes.").
231 Orin Kerr, A Confusing Proposal to Reform the Mens Rea of Federal Criminal Law,
WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/11/25/a-confusing-proposal-to-reform-the-mens-rea-of-federalcriminal-law/?utm-term=.e03b26ea4aOO. For additional materials and commentary,
see The Adequacy of Criminal Intent Standards in Federal Prosecutions: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Sen. Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary and Sen. Leahy, Member, S. Comm. on the
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if the offense consists of conduct that a reasonable person in
the same or similar circumstances would not know, or would
not have reason to believe, was unlawful, the Government
must prove that the defendant knew, or had reason to believe,
the conduct was unlawful. 232
The statute elicited a number of negative responses, both from those
who believed it was unnecessarily confusing, as well as those who
worried that it would unduly impair prosecutions of white collar
offenders. 233
Rather than enact a one-size-fits-all mens rea statute, Congress
might instead turn its attention to specific statutes, such as mail or
securities fraud. 234 For example, one could imagine the creation of a
more nuanced scheme of graded liability that included a lesser
"attempt" offense alongside more serious inchoate schemes; permitted
misdemeanor charges for employees who rendered minimal assistance;
and eliminated the pernicious Pinkerton doctrine that holds a coconspirator liable for his confederate's foreseeable crimes in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
Legislative reforms such as these would vastly transform federal
criminal law and with it, the whistleblowing landscape, significantly
altering the ratio of Complicits to Innocents. Unfortunately, these
reforms also would reduce the likelihood that wrongdoers will be
punished. Newly enacted laws, if poorly written, could decriminalize
not only the low-level and reluctant participants, but also
sophisticated and venal wrongdoers. Even if one attempted to cure
this problem linguistically (for example, by making it clear that only
the most tenuous participants should escape liability), evidentiary
Judiciary ).
232 Criminal Improvement Act of 2015, H.R. 4002, 114th Cong. § 11 (2015)
("Default state of mind proof requirement in Federal criminal cases."). For a defense
of this proposed bill, see Gideon Yaffe, A Republican Crime Proposal that Democrats
Should Back, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/
opinion/a-republican-crime-proposal-that-democrats-should-back.html.
233 The Adequacy of Criminal Intent Standards in Federal Prosecutions: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1, 3 (2016) (statement of Leslie R. Caldwell,
Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division); Mike DeBonis, The Issue that Could Keep
Congress from Passing Criminal Justice Reform, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/01/20/the-issue-that-couldkeep-congress-from-passing-criminal-justice-reform/; Jennifer Taub, Going Soft on White
Collar Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/
business/dealbook/going-soft-on-white-collar-crime.html.
234 For an overview of the mens rea requirement in federal criminal securities fraud
cases, see Buell, Securities Fraud, supra note 22, at 573.
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problems would invariably arise when sophisticated actors attempted
to pass themselves off as lesser participants at either the trial or
sentencing stages of prosecution.
In lieu of statutory reform, one might instead prefer prosecutors to
employ their considerable discretion to decline cases that are
technically legitimate, but otherwise diverge from the public's notion
of wrongfulness.235 As Judge Gerard Lynch observed in his seminal
piece on federal white-collar crime, the delineation of what is and is
not a crime occurs in conference rooms behind closed doors, wherein
defense attorneys attempt to persuade prosecutors that the set of
events surrounding a particular client's case does not merit a criminal
prosecution. 236
Discretion of this sort has long had its detractors, and for good
reason. 237 Particularly in the federal system, discretion transfers
enormous amounts of unchecked power to unelected officials. It lacks
transparency, undermines legitimacy, and is thought to favor the
wealthiest and most well-connected defendants. Most importantly for
our purposes, its effect on whistleblowing is negligible. Low-level and
reluctant Complicits who have no idea, ex ante, whether a prosecutor
will exercise his discretion in their favor are not very likely to come
forward.
If any narrowing strategy is to improve whistleblowing rates by
reducing the number of Complicits, it will almost certainly lie in
legislative reform. Reform efforts focused exclusively on fraud or
bribery statutes, however, would almost immediately draw criticisms
from the political left, and rightfully so. By the same token, conspiracy
and aiding and abetting laws have long been "transsubstantive." 238 Any
235 See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminaljustice, 66 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2117, 2125-26 (1998) (describing common interactions between criminal
defense attorneys and prosecutors regarding disposition of white collar criminal
investigations). Josh Bowers has undertaken a deeper and more theoretical analysis of
the prosecutor's obligation and power to incorporate equitable considerations when
deciding how and whether to charge a defendant with a particular crime. See Josh
Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute,
110 COLUM. L. REv. 1655, 1658-59 (2010) (introducing concept of "equitable"
prosecutorial discretion).
236 Lynch, supra note 235, at 2126.
237 "A central campaign of the modem age - extending far beyond sentencing and
the criminal justice system - has been to reduce the discretion of government
officials." Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum:Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of
Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1422 (2008) (analyzing modern-day efforts to reign in
judicial and prosecutorial discretion).
238 For examples of transsubstantive rules in other contexts, see Erin R. Collins,
The Evidentiary Rules of Engagement in the War Against Domestic Violence, 90 N.Y.U. L.
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attempt to overhaul these laws solely for white-collar offenders would
also surely fail. Whatever federal criminal law's future, its reform will
not arise out of whistleblowing. Nor should it.
B.

Amnesty

The much easier and neater fix would be to create amnesty for
individuals who report crime through the SEC's whistleblowing
channel. Currently, Section 21F explicitly warns the whistleblower
that amnesty does not exist, but Congress could remove this
impediment if it so desired. To do so, Congress would have to bind
not only the SEC, but also the Department of Justice, which retains
exclusive authority over federal criminal cases. 239
It is important to note the difference between an amnesty program,
which shields an individual from prosecution altogether, and a
criminal cooperation regime, which requires assistance and an
240
admission of wrongdoing in exchange for a reduction in sentence.
Under certain circumstances, the criminal cooperation program can be
quite generous. Federal prosecutors may go so far as to extend certain
individuals "non-prosecution" agreements or otherwise immunize
testimony from prosecution. 241 The United States Attorneys Manual
discourages such largess, however, and instead prefers the extraction
242
of a guilty plea paired with the promise of leniency at sentencing. As
for the SEC, it cannot do much more than offer its own version of
cooperation-based leniency to witnesses in civil actions. 243 On its own,
REv. 397, 413 (2015) (contending that evidence rules purport to reflect
"transsubstantive values"), and William Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the
Transsubstantive FourthAmendment, 114 HARv. L. REv. 842, 856-69 (2001) (describing
Fourth Amendment doctrines as transsubstantive).
239 For more on the SEC's inability to unilaterally initiate or decline criminal cases,
see Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REv. 577, 623 & nn.218-19
(2012) (citing authorities).
240 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-27.430(B)(1) (1997), https://www.justice.
2 6 00
(urging caution in
gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9- 7.
diverging from general rule requiring defendant to plead to charges "consistent with the
nature and extent of his/her criminal conduct"); id. § 9-27.600 (permitting nonprosecution agreements when "other means of obtaining the desired cooperation are
unavailable and would not be effective").
241 The Department of Justice retains sole authority to seek immunity for a witness
under the federal immunity statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (2012). Although the SEC
can recommend immunity, it has no power to actually seek or confer it.
242 See generally authorities cited supra note 240.
243 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, No. 34-61340, POLIcY STATEMENT CONCERNING
COOPERATION BY INDIVIDUALS IN ITS INVESTIGATIONS AND RELATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

(2010), https://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/2010/34-61340.pdf.

By its terms, the Policy
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the SEC is powerless to promise the whistleblower protection from
criminal prosecution. 244
Given the foregoing, one might wonder why Complicits need any
inducement to speak at all, since the SEC and DOJ have long had in
place separate cooperation policies. 245 Criminal cooperation works,
however, only when the government's successful prosecution is itself
imminent. Those familiar with the prosecution of Raj Rajaratnam and
his insider trading ring may recall that one of the government's
strongest witnesses was Anil Kumar, a cooperating defendant whose
testimony played crucial role in Rajaratnam's conviction and the
conviction of one of Rajaratnam's co-conspirators, Rajat Gupta, who
was also a Goldman Sachs director. 24 6 Kumar's information was both
extensive and valuable, and he was rewarded with a glowing
prosecutor's letter on his behalf at his sentencing. 247 Then again,
Kumar had very good reason to cooperate: a wiretap captured his
conversations on several occasions in 2008, thereby documenting his
participation in insider trading schemes.2 48 By the time the
government approached Kumar, his complicity and reason to
cooperate were already well established.
Cases like these remain the exceptions in white-collar criminal
practice. In many cases, the complicit employee flies under the radar.
Absent an unusual situation, the government will lack credible
evidence of an employee's mens rea unless, of course, he happens to
find himself caught on a wiretap or engaging in some unrelated crime
that places him in contact with an undercover agent or snitch.
Accordingly, for many investigations, the criminal cooperation regime
will yield as much information as a monetary bounty: little to none.

Statement creates no "legally enforceable rights" and extends solely to civil
enforcement actions within the SEC's jurisdiction.
244 17 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2016) ("[N]either the Commission nor its staff has the
authority or responsibility for instituting, conducting, settling, or otherwise disposing
of criminal proceedings.").
245 Pacella suggests as much when she hypothesizes, "the availability of leniency or
immunity to potential whistleblowers likely facing criminal prosecution may be
enough to incentivize such persons to disclose wrongdoing." Pacella, Bounties for Bad
Behavior, supra note 9, at 375; see also id. at 376 nn.174-76 (citing similar comments
in lead up to SEC whistleblowing program's adoption).
246 See Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't of Justice to the Hon. Denny Chin 19
(July 16, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/071612kumar.pdf.
247 Id. at 15-19.
248 Id. at 6 (describing wiretap recordings of conversations between Kumar and
others).
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We now reach the solution most commonly touted by students of
antitrust and tax enforcement: if criminal cooperation is unlikely and a
pure monetary bounty undesirable, why not pair a modest financial
reward with the promise of true forgiveness (i.e., amnesty) for the
admitted crime? Surely, some employees will come forward if: (a)
punishment is off the table, and (b) a modest reward accompanies
their information. To put it another way, if criminal law's salience is
responsible for engineering the distinction between the Innocent and
the Complicit, then why not take eliminate criminal liability for those
who voluntarily disclose wrongdoing?
Amnesty certainly is not unheard of. State and federal tax authorities
have periodically extended it to taxpayers who voluntarily disclose
violations and pay penalties. 249 More pertinently, the DOJ's Antitrust
Division employs a Corporate Leniency program for corporate cartel
members and their executives. 250 Under its Leniency Program, the first
cartel organization to voluntarily disclose wrongdoing receives a grant
of full amnesty for antitrust violations, for both the company and its
employees, provided they cooperate in the ensuing investigation. 251
Each additional cartel member who comes forward is then eligible for
a rapidly decreasing discount in liability. 252 Thus, the Antitrust
Division's program places a great premium on being first to defect. 253

249 See, e.g., Allen D. Madison, An Analysis of the IRS's Voluntary Disclosure Policy,
54 TAX LAw. 729, 729 (2001); Leo Martinez, Federal Tax Amnesty: Crime and
Punishment Revisited, 10 VA. TAX REV. 535, 542-49 (1991). See generally Bonnie Ross,
Federal Tax Amnesty: Reflecting on the States' Experiences, 40 TAX LAw. 145 (1986)
(discussing the history of tax amnesty programs).
250 The Antitrust Division employs both a Corporate Leniency Policy (1993) for
firms, and an Individual Leniency Policy (1994) for the individuals employed by those
firms. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993), https://www.
justice.gov/atr/file/810281/download (Corporate Policy); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
INDIVIDUAL LENIENCY POLICY (1994), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/
legacy/2006/04/27/0092.pdf (Individual Policy). Unlike the SEC's Leniency Policy, the
Antitrust Division's individual policy function as an amnesty program, as it promises
qualifying individuals that they will not be charged criminally for the activity being
reported.
251 Brent Snyder, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Just., Remarks at the
Yale Global Antitrust Enforcement Conference (Feb 19. 2016), 2016 WL 676020, at
*4 (explaining that because only the first whistleblower receives full amnesty, the
program creates "a race to the prosecutor's door"). For criticisms of this mentality, see
Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the
Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations,69 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
715, 716 (2001) (contending that the "potential for excessive expenditures is
exaggerated by the 'first to cooperate' nature of the Division's Corporate Leniency
Policy").
252 For a helpful overview of the Antitrust Division's program and its breadth in
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the Antitrust Division's program an

unqualified success. 2 5 4 By spurring defections, it has increased the

coordination and monitoring costs of running a cartel. 255 Could
Congress amend Dodd-Frank to mimic the Antitrust Division's
program? Yes, but there are a number of reasons it would not want
to. 256 First, unless very carefully monitored, a broad amnesty program
could easily undermine deterrence. 257 It is one thing to use
government bounties to alleviate the social and psychological costs of
tattling on one's peers. It is quite another matter to eliminate entirely
the very penalties the government puts in place to deter wrongdoing.

terms of amnesty, see Morning Star Packing Co. v. S.K. Foods, L.P., No. 2:09-cv00208-KJM-KJN, 2015 WL 3797774, at *5-7 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2015).
253 By contrast, the DOJ's cooperation practices emphasize the would-be
cooperator's willingness and ability to assist the government. For more on the process
of assessing and signing up a criminal defendant as a cooperator, see Gleeson,
Supervising Criminal Investigations, supra note 12, at 447-50 (describing prosecutor's
process of meeting with and "proffering" potential cooperators).
254 Gary R Spratling, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Just., Making
Companies an Offer They Shouldn't Refuse: The Antitrust Division's Corporate
Leniency Policy - An Update, Presentation to Bar Association of the District of
Columbia's 35th Annual Symposium on Associations and Antitrust 3 (Feb. 16, 1999),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2247.htm.
255 See Renata B. Hesse, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Can There be a "One-World Approach" to Competition Law?, Remarks at the
Chatham House Conference on Globalization of Competition Policy (June 23, 2016),
2016 WL 3439992 (declaring policy as having "revolutionized our cartel enforcement,
and served as a model for jurisdictions around the world").
256 Pacella nods in this direction when she discusses the SEC's
Cooperation Policy,
which was adopted in 2010. Pacella, Bountiesfor Bad Behavior, supra note 9, at 376-77.
The Policy, which was purposely modeled after its DOJ analog, purports to promise
firms and individuals who voluntarily disclose wrongdoing leniency in terms of
sanctions. See generally U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, POLICY STATEMENT CONCERNING
COOPERATION BY INDIVIDUALS IN ITS INVESTIGATIONS AND RELATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

(2010),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/2010/34-61340.pdf
(laying
out
the
Enforcement Division's analytical framework); SEC Enforcement Cooperation Program,
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enfcoopinitiative.
shtml (last modified Sept. 20, 2016) (describing considerations for leniency). These
policy statements indicate the framework the SEC employs when meting out civil
sanctions; they do not promise civil amnesty for any reporting whistleblower. Nor do
they make any claims with regard to criminal punishment.
257 Pacella raises a variant of this concern, criticizing the IRS's program because it
effectively "pays" individuals to break the law. Pacella, Bounties for Bad Behavior, supra
note 9, at 354. Since the IRS program leaves the taxpayer exposed to criminal
prosecution, however, it is questionable how much its reward program (available only
to those convicted offenders who were neither instigators nor leaders in criminal
schemes) affects criminal behavior. It may not deter criminal behavior, but it is
doubtful that it encourages it either.
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Criminal liability is not simply another "cost" the whistleblower
suffers. It is the cost presumed to best deter wrongdoing, assuming a
credible probability of detection. If overused or improperly used, an
amnesty program could convey the message that it is fine to join
criminal conspiracies, so long as one admits the wrongdoing first to
authorities. 258
In a related vein, amnesty could easily erode public support for
whistleblowing generally. If the government retains its confidentiality
pledge, but otherwise publicizes generally its grant of amnesty to some
Complicits and its payment of monetary bounties to others, the
general public will infer that some undisclosed number of
whistleblowers are themselves guilty of wrongdoing. This, in turn may
cause the public to look upon whistleblowers with increased cynicism.
If the public reverts to viewing whistleblowers as snitches and rats, the
psychological and social costs of disclosure will increase for all
whistleblowers. 259
Third, a first-in-the-door amnesty program would almost certainly
compete with the program the government already has in place for
combatting crime: criminal cooperation. The Department of Justice
already trades leniency for information, and this program very
carefully avoids, in most instances, pure amnesty. 260 It also avoids
mechanical reliance on the order of disclosure; if the second person to
confess provides better information than the first or appears to be a
more sincere or better witness than the first, federal prosecutors
remain free to choose their best cooperator. 26 1 Indeed, federal
prosecutors remain free to choose more than one cooperator, if their
case warrants the additional assistance.
A first-in-the-door amnesty program operates well when all
participants in a given scheme are assumed to have more or less the same
quality of information. That may be a safe assumption for members of a
cartel, but for a fraud or bribery scheme, it is more contestable. Some
258 1 have argued elsewhere that an improperly structured criminal cooperation
program may in fact reduce the overall expected sanction for crimes, thereby
undermining deterrence. See Baer, Cooperation'sCost, supra note 136, at 904.
259 If whistleblowing's social and psychological costs increase, then the government
must increase its bounty, which also increases the risk of false reports. Cf. Givati,
supra note 24, at 45 (observing a high risk of "false report" when "the reward that is
required to deter the employer is so high" that it induces false tips).
260 See discussion supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
261 As a result, the DOJ can collect multiple proffers from several witnesses but is
under no obligation to "pay" for that information with a cooperation agreement. See
Baer, Cooperation's Cost, supra note 136, at 920-23 (describing beneficial "detection
effect" of cooperation).
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individuals will have far more information than others, or be better
witnesses because of their position or previous history.
Even if one can move past these problems, there exists an additional
wrinkle. The DOJ's antitrust leniency program works because it is
narrowly applied and highly administrable. In a cartel of five or six
producers, it should not be terribly difficult to discern which
participant first disclosed wrongdoing to the Department of Justice's
relatively small investigatory division. 262 Among a corporation of ten
thousand employees, however, it may well be far more difficult to
identify the "first" employee to disclose wrongdoing, particularly
when the recipients of such information include multiple federal
agencies, the state attorney general, the local district attorney's office,
and the company's internal compliance program. Concededly, this
problem already arises when the SEC is tasked with allocating a
bounty among more than one whistleblower. 263 The stakes increase
dramatically, however, when the benefit conferred by the government
is no longer just a contingent bounty, but in fact amnesty, available for
the first -

and only the first -

C.

person who discloses.

Developing Alternatives

There are no easy solutions to the whistleblower's dilemma.
Narrowing criminal law's scope of liability is itself a difficult task and
ultimately, is best guided by considerations other than whistleblowing.
Amnesty is difficult to administer and can undermine other
enforcement tools. Concededly, the SEC and DOJ could promise a sort
of informal amnesty, with a nod and wink, but it is doubtful that any
defense attorney worth his salt would advise his client to file a
whistleblowing claim on assurances so flimsy.
So that just brings us back to square one. If it is impossible to
remove criminal liability, either broadly or narrowly, for the
individuals who engage in wrongdoing within firms, then the
government should seek out alternative methods for investigating,
prosecuting and deterring corporate wrongdoing. It should rely more
often on wiretaps and undercover agents, and ramp up its capacity to
review emails, documents, and the massive amounts of data that
suggest criminal conduct. In some notable cases, the government has

262 Even here, one expects the occasional controversy to ensue.
263 See Rose, supra note 27, at 1263 (analyzing hypothetical scenario wherein two
co-workers might separately report wrongdoing to the SEC).
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already done this, but the "white collar sting" has yet to evolve into
the powerhouse that undercover drug operations have become. 264
In its first five years of existence, the SEC's whistleblower program
has issued awards to approximately thirty-four whistleblowers in
connection with twenty-six "covered actions." 265 Roughly sixty-five
percent of those whistleblowers were current or former employees of
the target company. 266 Thus, over a five year period, the SEC's
no doubt implemented with a high level of
program professionalism and diligence - has elicited valuable information
from approximately twenty additional insiders. No doubt, the
aggregate dollar value of this information has been substantial, but the
program's deterrent value, to the extent deterrence depends in great
measure on probability of detection, is more ambiguous.
Moreover, the policy question is not simply whether a
whistleblowing program deters, but how well it deters in comparison
to some other alternative. If the perpetrators of securities fraud and
foreign bribery schemes are even boundedly rational, it seems far more
likely that wiretaps and dragnet-style investigations would impact the
white-collar criminal landscape more effectively than even the most
well-administered whistleblowing program.
And there's the rub. Compared to the enforcement tools described
above, whistleblowing is cheap, and in more than one way. Wiretaps
and undercover stings are easily more expensive than even the more
generous bounty program, in part because these methods often require
an increase in manpower. 267 Moreover, as Professor Samuel Buell has
observed, a true crackdown on crimes such as fraud and bribery would
likely mean a sea change in how the government treats white-collar
offenders. 268 More frequent use of undercover stings, wiretaps and
covert surveillance, would likely result in the prosecution of far more

264 For a thoughtful discussion of the government's use of undercover tactics in
investigating penny stock frauds, see Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, Sting
Victims: Third-Party Harms in Undercover Police Operations, 88 S. CAL. L. REv. 1309,
1340 (2015) (observing that undercover stings "produce clear evidence of criminal
conduct" against defendants and defense lawyers who "are likely to be less
sophisticated than Wall Street executives").
265 SEC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17. Thus, several of the covered
actions resulted in payments to more than one whistleblower.
266 Id. at 18 (noting that "65 percent of award recipients were insiders of the entity
on which they reported information of wrongdoing to the SEC").
267 See Givati, supra note 24, at 51-52 (demonstrating whistleblowing's superiority
over external policing because policing requires additional expenditures).
268 Buell, White Collar Offender, supra note 20, at 876-77.
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mid- and lower-level corporate employees. 269 A ramped up "street
crimes" approach to corporate crime would require society to commit
to a variety of expenditures, not only in terms of money, but also in
terms of reduced privacy. No wonder, then, that the SEC prefers
instead to embrace its public-friendly role as the whistleblower's
"advocate." 270

Path dependence likely predicts the whistleblowing program's
continued existence, regardless of how well it actually deters serious
misconduct. Neither Congress nor the SEC derives any political
capital from shutting it down. The program has boosted agency
morale and reinforces the Commission's long-held self-image as
protector of the investing public. It has encouraged the Commission to
revamp internal processes for channeling information from potential
witnesses to investigators. Its annual report to Congress provides a
window on the agency's enforcement activity. And, as the program
itself demonstrates, some Innocents do witness misconduct, and their
assistance in reporting such misconduct can be quite helpful.
Cancelling the bounty program forecloses these benefits.
Thus, the optimal move might be to emphasize the program's
notably large recoveries, which is exactly what the SEC has chosen to
do. This too has its drawbacks. Chief among them are the opportunity
costs of foregoing or minimizing alternative enforcement tactics.
Moreover, a low ratio of credible whistleblowers to tips will eventually
draw attention. If wrongdoers conclude that whistleblowing bounties
carry more bark than bite, whatever modest effect the bounty program
currently has will then decrease. 271

269 Concededly, the DOJ may already be moving in that direction.
See Joh & Joo,
supra note 264, at 1339-40 (describing emergence of sting tactics against perpetrators
of penny stock fraud schemes); see also Rachel E. Barkow, The New Policingof Business
Crime, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 435, 460-64 (2014) (citing use of wiretaps and similar
tactics in insider trading investigations); Ellen Brotman & Erin Dougherty, Blue Collar
Tactics in White CollarCases, 35 CHAMPION 16, 16 (2011). But see Buell, White Collar
Offender, supra note 20, at 876-77 (warning that undercover stings and wiretaps are
likely to remain infrequent in most fraud cases).
270 This is the term SEC Commissioner Mary Jo White used in a speech last year.
See Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The SEC as Whistleblower's
Advocate, Remarks Delivered at Corporate and Securities Law Institute, Northwestern
University School of Law (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chairwhite-remarks-at-garrett-institute.html.
271 Cf. Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In
Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 241 (1995)
(reflecting that whistleblower rules deter misconduct only when wrongdoers believe
they are effective in eliciting information).
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CONCLUSION

Since its implementation in 2011, the SEC's whistleblowing program
has attracted a significant amount of attention from practitioners and
scholars. This positive attention is unlikely to abate. The program is
expected to survive the administration of President Donald Trump and
the SEC will no doubt continue to highlight its notable awards.
Nevertheless, the program has yet to generate the ratio of useful
information to noise that one might desire from an enforcement tool
geared towards deterrence. The SEC's bounty program may eventually
recover billions of dollars, but it is far from clear how well it will deter
the serious criminal activity it was designed to confront.
Assuming the program remains intact, the reforms that scholars
have already advanced may well improve the program by clarifying its
reach and filling some gaps. Nevertheless, most accounts of
whistleblowing fail to address at length its interaction with federal
criminal law. When criminal punishment is salient, the workplace
splinters into Innocents and Complicits. The Complicit employee who
has provided even a relatively minor amount of assistance in
implementing or concealing an illicit scheme takes a massive risk by
filing a whistleblowing complaint.
Policymakers can draw two lessons from this parable. First, the
whistleblower's dilemma underscores the ways in which a tool
intended to secure deterrence also reduces the flow of information to
enforcement authorities. Policymakers who tout corporate compliance
programs must recognize the extent to which compliance may
negatively affect the flow of information, both within the firm and to
outside enforcement agencies. At their best, organizational compliance
programs provide a safe space for employees to report concerns, and
deter wrongdoing by increasing the likelihood of detection and
punishment. Among undeterred individuals, however, these same
mechanisms reduce the number of individuals likely to come forward
with information.
The second lesson is one of caution. Whistleblowing bounties
attract public support precisely because they hew to an innocence
narrative. Bounties are intuitively pleasing because they redress the
financial harms that anti-retaliation laws fail to prevent. The bounty
system's efficacy breaks down, however, when it operates in
conjunction with a criminal justice system intent on obliterating
distinctions between ringleaders and bit players, and between those
who methodically plan wrongdoing and those who impulsively fall
into it. Substantive crimes such as fraud and bribery require fairly little
in terms of actus reus; crimes such as conspiracy require even less.

2280

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:2215

When mens rea can actually be established and proven, the federal
criminal justice system becomes a rather frightening and potent
weapon.
If guilt rises and falls on state-of-mind evidence, then
whistleblowing quickly becomes a form of self-incrimination. When
mens rea becomes the statutory element that divides bad judgment
from outright fraud, even boundedly rational individuals will shy away
from self-incriminatory tools that all but strip them of their most
effective armor. Accordingly, if the government wishes to elicit
information from Complicits - and to deter difficult to detect crimes
like fraud and bribery - it needs to offer something far different from
money. And to do that, it needs to commit the requisite time and
resources to developing enforcement strategies more effective and
long-lasting than even the most user friendly bounty program.

